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   IN MEMORIAM
On July 20, 2012 38-year-old Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police Constable 
Derek Pineo was killed in a single 
vehicle crash when his patrol car struck 
a moose near Wilkie, Saskatchewan at 
about 2:00 am. Constable Pineo had 
served with the RCMP for five years. 
He is survived by his wife, three 
children, and parents. 
On August 10, 2012 Municipal District of Foothills Protective Services (Alberta) 
Community Peace Officer Rod Lazenby was beaten and killed during  a confrontation 
with a subject on a rural ranch who was illegally housing over 30 dogs.
Officer Lazenby had gone to the ranch to speak to the man about the repeated 
offence when a confrontation occurred and Officer Lazenby was critically injured. 
The subject involved in the confrontation with Officer Lazenby then drove him to a 
police station in Calgary. Officer Laznby was transported to a nearby hospital where 
he was pronounced dead.
The subject who assaulted Officer Lazenby was charged with first degree murder.
Officer Lazenby had served with the Municipal District of Foothills for three years after retiring  from the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police with 35 years of service. He is survived by his wife and five children.
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
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Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
IN SERVICE: 10-8 ONLINE
All back issues of the newsletter are available online 
at www.10-8.ca. If you would like to be added to 
the electronic distribution list for the newsletter 
simply send an email to mnovakowski@jibc.ca. 
When the newsletter is completed it will be sent 
directly to your email address so you won’t miss out 
on any of the case law featured in each issue.
www.10–8.ca
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA, LLM. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list e-mail Mike 
Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
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Tactical Criminal 
Analysis
www.jibc.ca
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 7-9, 2013
Mark your calendars. The British 
Columbia Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of British 
Columbia Police Academy are 
hosting  the Police Leadership 
2013 Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada’s largest police 
leadership conference and will provide an 
opportunity for delegates to discuss leadership 
topics presented by world renowned speakers.
“The Service of Policing: Meeting Public Expectations”
www.policeleadershipconference.com
see 
pages 
42-43
see pages 36-37
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The ABCs of evaluation: timeless techniques for 
program and project managers.
John Boulmetis, Phyllis Dutwin.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011.
HD 31 B633 2011
The adult learner: the definitive classic in adult 
education and human resource development.
Malcolm S. Knowles, Elwood F. Holton III, Richard 
A. Swanson.
Amsterdam; Boston: Elsevier, 2011.
LC 5225 L42 K56 2011
Becoming a master student.
Dave Ellis, Doug  Toft (contributing  editor), Debra 
Dawson.
Toronto, ON: Nelson Education, c2012.
LB 2343.3 E44 2012
Coaching  for leadership: writings on leadership 
from the world's greatest coaches.
editors, Marshall Goldsmith, Laurence S. Lyons, 
Sarah McArthur.
San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, c2012.
HD 30.4 C63 2012
Co-active coaching: changing  business, 
transforming lives.
Henry Kimsey-House, Karen Kimsey-House, Phillip 
Sandahl.
Boston, MA: Nicholas Brealey Pub., 2011.
HF 5549.5 C53 K56 2011
Combating  memory loss:  common problems and 
treatments.
Boston, MA: Massachusetts General Hospital, 2011.
RC 394 M46 C55 2011
Creative thinking skills. [videorecording]
Burnaby, BC: Distribution Access [distributor], 
c2010.
1 videodisc (DVD) (26 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in.
English captions for the deaf and hearing impaired.
Creativity can be the difference between success 
and failure. When all! solutions escape you, creative 
thinking can provide another perspective.
This program explores how we as individuals can 
become more creative and develop a questioning 
mindset, enhancing  our ability to generate,! 
challenge, test and reinvent ideas.
BF 408 C743 2010 D1412
The developing  mind: how relationships and the 
brain interact to shape who we are.
Daniel J. Siegel.
New York, NY: Guilford Press, c2012.
BF 713 S525 2012
An employer's guide to surveillance, searches and 
medical examinations.
John C. O'Reilly, Katherine Ford.
Toronto, ON: Carswell, c2012.
HF 5549.5 E428 O74 2012
Evaluating research articles from start to finish. 
Ellen R. Girden, Robert I. Kabacoff.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, c2011.
Q 180.55 E9 G57 2011
A first-rate madness: uncovering the links 
between leadership and mental illness.
Nassir Ghaemi.
New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2011.
RC 537 G479 2011
The five levels of leadership: proven steps to 
maximize your potential.
John C. Maxwell.
New York, NY: Center Street, 2011.
HD 57.7 M394 2011
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The four styles. [videorecording]
production services provided by TS Media Inc.
[S.l.]: EIC Incorporated; Port Perry, ON: Owen-
Stewart Performance Resources Inc. [distributor], 
c2008.
1 videodisc (22 min.): sd.,  col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD) + 1 CD-ROM 
(4 3/4 in.)
Accompanying  CD-ROM contains leader's guide, 
section breakdown in PDF and Microsoft PowerPoint 
presentation. Scientific research shows that people 
communicate, think and behave! differently. 
Generally they fall into four categories: suportives, 
emotives, reflectives and directives. In this 3-part 
program you will learn about these four behavior 
styles and what's included in them, learn! ! !  how to 
identify these styles in others and how to change 
your behavior to better communicate with others.
HF 5718 F687 2008 (Restricted to in-house.) D1431
Hungry: fuelling your best game.
Ryan Walter.
Surrey, BC: Heads-Up Communications Corp., 
c2011.
BF 637 S8 W35 2011
Incognito: the secret lives of the brain.
David M. Eagleman.
Toronto, ON: Viking Canada, c2011.
BF 315 E24 2011
Legal help for British Columbians:  a guide to help 
non-legal  professionals make legal referrals for 
their clients.
Cliff Thorstenson.
[British Columbia]: Courthouse Libraries BC, c2012.
KEB 174 T46 2012
Meetings, bloody meetings. [videorecording] 
produced by Video Arts Limited.
London: Video Arts; Mississauga, ON: RG Training 
[distributor], c2012.
1 videodisc (33 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
Title from disc.
Title of accompanying  manual: Meetings, bloody 
meetings: making meetings more productive.
written by Pat Mitchell.
Manual publication date: 2012.
Enhanced DVD features include: course leader's 
guide (PDF file); presentation slides (PPT files); group 
training  workbook, self-study workbook, objectives 
and programme outline, certificate (Word files).
This updated version of the classic film illustrates the 
five basic principles for conducting  productive 
meetings. In a nightmarish court, a cynical manager 
is found guilty of failing  to prepare himself and 
inform others about the meeting agenda.
HD 2743 M43 2012 D1423
The mentor's guide: facilitating  effective learning 
relationships.
Lois! J. Zachary.
San Francisco, CA : Jossey-Bass, c2012.
LB 1731.4 Z23 2012
The polyvagal theory:  neurophysiological 
foundat ions o f emot ions , a t tachment , 
communication, and self-regulation.
Stephen W. Porges.
New York, NY: W. W. Norton, c2011.
QP 401 P67 2011
The post-traumatic stress disorder sourcebook: a 
guide to healing, recovery, and growth.
Glenn R. Schiraldi.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, c2009.
RC 552 P67 S326 2009
Quiet: the power of introverts in a world that 
can't stop talking.
Susan Cain.
New York, NY: Crown Publishers, c2012.
BF 698.35 I59 C35 2012
Twelve steps to a compassionate life.
Karen Armstrong.
Toronto, ON: Knopf Canada, c2011.
BL 624 A74 2011
Working  in high risk environments: developing 
sustained resilience.
edited by Douglas Paton and John M. Violanti.
Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, c2011.
HF 5548.85 W678 2011
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ABSENCE OF SUBJECTIVE 
SUSPICION FATAL TO 
DETENTION’S LEGALITY 
R. v. Dhillon, 2012 BCCA 254
Police were dispatched to the parking 
lot of a Subway restaurant in response 
to a fight complaint involving  a group 
of 12 South Asian males and found 
several South Asian males out front of 
it. There was also a BMW with its passenger door 
open parked at an angle to the linear parking  stalls, 
suggesting  someone might have left it in a hurry. A 
police officer informed the group that he was 
investigating  a complaint about a fight. The men said 
there was no fight and there was no evidence of one. 
The complaint was concluded as unfounded but the 
officer recognized an individual in the group from 
previous dealings and police intelligence as 
someone involved in violent criminal activity and 
associated with firearms. He became suspicious that 
weapons might be present. Upon inquiring  as to the 
BMW’s ownership, the accused came forward and, 
when asked if he had any identification, produced 
his driver’s licence from the middle console of the 
vehicle. The officer saw a pair of scissors and some 
rolling  papers in the console. In his experience those 
items were typically associated with marijuana use 
but he did not see or smell any burnt or fresh 
marijuana. The possibility of drugs in the vehicle 
again made the officer suspicious that there might be 
weapons in it. 
Although he had not seen any drugs or weapons 
inside the main body of the vehicle, the officer 
decided to search the trunk where he found a 
Norico assault rifle (an AK-47 knock-off) covered in 
towels. A 30-round magazine was attached. The 
accused was arrested, handcuffed, patted-down and 
placed in the back of a police vehicle. About four 
minutes had elapsed between the accused 
identifying  himself as the vehicle’s owner and his 
arrest. Shortly thereafter, two men associated with a 
criminal gang  arrived. They were known to carry 
handguns, wear body armour and were previously 
involved in shootings. More backup was summoned 
and all the men were handcuffed and searched. 
Forty-five minutes later the officer advised the 
accused why he was arrested and told him about his 
right to counsel. Then, about an hour later, he was 
provided access to a telephone at the police station 
for the purpose of contacting legal counsel. 
British Columbia Provincial Court (trial)
The officer acknowledged that he did not 
have reasonable grounds to obtain a 
search warrant, nor to arrest or detain the 
accused for investigative purposes and 
therefore did not have authority to conduct a search 
for officer safety reasons. (Instead, he claimed he 
had the accused’s consent, which was later found to 
be invalid). The trial judge, however, concluded that 
there were no Charter violations. She found the 
accused was lawfully detained pursuant to an 
investigative detention. The presence of drug 
paraphernalia in the vehicle, the manner in which 
the vehicle was parked and the presence of a known 
violent offender in the group of males gave the 
officer both subjective and objective grounds to 
detain the group of men, including  the accused, for 
investigation in relation to the fight complaint. “It 
would be naive and unrealistic to expect that the 
police when investigating  an assault would accept 
the word of a group of people there when they deny 
an assault ever took place, especially given the 
known violent person within the group,” said the 
judge. “Up to the point where the accused is 
arrested, interference with his liberty was minimal, 
only to the extent required for the officers to do their 
duty in checking out a potential assault.” 
Since the accused was lawfully detained for 
investigative purposes, the search of his vehicle for 
officer and public safety reasons was reasonable as 
incidental to the detention. As for the 45-minute 
delay in providing  a reason for detention and 
advising  the accused of his right to retain and 
instruct counsel, it was not intentional but due to the 
volatility and potential danger of the situation. Plus, 
even if the accused’s rights were breached, the 
firearm would have been admitted as evidence 
under s. 24(2) anyway. The accused was convicted of 
four firearm and weapon related offences; 
possessing  a firearm without a licence, carrying  a 
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concealed weapon, being  an occupant of a motor 
vehicle knowing  there was a prohibited weapon and 
possessing a prohibited device. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in characterizing  the 
sea rch a s inc iden ta l to an 
investigative detention. In his view, 
the officer did not subjectively believe that he had 
reasonable grounds to detain him and therefore his 
detention was arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter. The 
vehicle search, he suggested, was also unlawful and 
breached s. 8  of the Charter. Thus, the firearm 
should have been excluded as evidence. The Crown, 
on the other hand, submitted that even if there was 
no lawful investigative detention, the search was still 
reasonable as a justifiable use of police powers in 
the exercise of the police duty to preserve the peace, 
prevent crime and protect life and property. 
The Detention
Justice Smith, authoring  the Court of Appeal’s 
unanimous judgment, described the test for 
detention this way:
Detention for Charter purposes exists where 
there is “a suspension of the individual’s liberty 
interest by a significant physical or psychological 
restraint”. Psychological detention occurs where 
an individual “submits or acquiesces in the 
deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes 
that the choice to do otherwise does not exist”. 
The determination of whether there has been 
detention is an objective test. Where there has 
been no physical restraint and no legal 
obligation to comply with a demand by a police 
officer, the question is whether “a reasonable 
person would conclude by reason of the state 
conduct that he or she had no choice but to 
comply”. [references omitted, para. 30]
A detention will not be arbitrary under s. 9 of the 
Charter if it is authorized by law, either statute or 
common law. Under the common law, the police 
may lawfully detain someone for an investigation if 
they have reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
targeted individual is involved in criminal activity. 
Reasonable suspicion is more than a hunch and 
includes both subjective and objective elements. In 
addition to the requirement of a reasonable 
suspicion, the detention must also be reasonably 
necessary in order to justify what would otherwise 
be an unreasonable interference with an individual’s 
liberty. 
In this case, the Court of Appeal found there was no 
detention. The officer said he did not detain the 
accused nor was there any control exerted over him. 
The accused was not physically restrained or 
directed to go anywhere or do anything  other than to 
step away from the vehicle when it was being 
searched. And even if the accused could have been 
lawfully detained, that is not what the police did. 
Instead, they arrested him. “When the police have 
wrongfully arrested someone, their actions cannot 
be defended on the basis that they could have 
detained this person on some other basis,” said 
Justice Smith. “In deciding  whether the police 
infringed Charter rights they are to be judged on 
what they did, not what they could have done.”
 
Moreover, the officer did not have reasonable 
grounds to detain as the trial judge mistakenly 
found. The officer did not form a subjective belief 
that the accused had been or was involved in a fight 
and found nothing  to support the complaint, which 
was concluded as unfounded. Nor did the officer 
claim to search the vehicle incidental to an 
investigative detention. Rather, he acknowledged he 
only had a bare suspicion that he might find drugs 
and/or weapons in the trunk of the vehicle, which 
did not rise to the level of reasonable grounds for 
detention. “The law requires both a subjective and 
an objective basis for an investigative detention,” 
“When the police have wrongfully arrested someone, their actions cannot be defended on 
the basis that they could have detained this person on some other basis. In deciding 
whether the police infringed Charter rights they are to be judged on what they did, not what 
they could have done.”
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said the Court. “Even if the trial judge’s finding  that 
there was an objective basis for detention were 
accepted, the complete absence of a subjective basis 
in this case is fatal to the finding  that there was a 
lawful investigative detention.”
The Search
Investigative Detention: In some cases a detained 
person may be searched. “Where there exist 
reasonable grounds to suspect that a detained 
individual is connected to a particular crime, officer 
or public safety concerns may justify a search 
incidental to that detention, which will typically 
involve a pat-down search of the detained 
individual,” said Justice Smith. “A lawful search 
incidental to an investigative detention requires 
‘reasonable grounds’ (i.e., an objective basis) for 
concerns about officer and/or public safety, and that 
the search be ‘reasonably necessary’ to ensure the 
preservation of the officer and/or public safety.” 
However, since the officer’s concern that the 
accused might possess drugs and/or weapons did 
not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, the 
search of the vehicle could not be justified as 
incidental to an investigative detention for officer 
and/or public safety reasons.
Waterfield Doctrine: The authority to conduct the 
search on the basis that it was reasonably necessary 
for officer and public safety reasons based on the 
Waterfield doctrine was also rejected. The Crown 
had tried to argue that the officer had a duty to 
search the trunk for the protection of the public and 
the officers present because of the nature of the 
suspected crimes and the potential for a high risk of 
violence. “To date, no court has recognized a police 
power to search based on a standard lower than that 
of objectively reasonable suspicion,” noted Justice 
Smith. “While I am not persuaded that a free-
standing  power to search for officer safety reasons 
should be recognized, if such a power were to be 
recognized, in my view it would, at a minimum, 
require this level of objectively reasonable grounds.” 
Here, the officer admitted he had nothing  more than 
a bare suspicion to support his concerns for officer 
and public safety. He also admitted that the vehicle 
could have been secured until more officers arrived, 
which ran directly counter to the argument that the 
search was necessary for public safety reasons. Thus, 
the search was neither objectively reasonable nor 
necessary, failing  the second branch of the 
Waterfield doctrine:
In short, while the Waterfield doctrine has 
developed a robust history in Canada, it has 
been limited by constitutional constraints and, in 
particular, by a requirement that police show an 
objectively reasonable basis for the exercise of 
any powers. This criterion is reflected in the 
second branch of the Waterfield doctrine, which 
requires that police conduct not involve an 
“unjustifiable use of police powers”. Canadian 
courts, to date, have held the exercise of a 
common law police power is only justified 
where its use is objectively reasonable and 
necessary. Thus, even if the Waterfield doctrine 
could be found to support the use of police 
powers based on concerns about safety rather 
than concerns about the commission of specific 
criminal offences, in my view at the very least 
those safety concerns would have to be 
objectively reasonable before they could serve 
as a free-standing justification for the use of 
police search powers. [para. 70]
s. 24(2) Charter
As a result of the Charter breaches, the firearm was 
excluded under s. 24(2). The Charter-infringing 
conduct was serious and the impact on the 
accused’s Charter-protected interests was significant. 
“Where there exist reasonable grounds to suspect that a detained individual is connected to a 
particular crime, officer or public safety concerns may justify a search incidental to that 
detention, which will typically involve a pat-down search of the detained individual. A lawful 
search incidental to an investigative detention requires ‘reasonable grounds’ (i.e., an objective 
basis) for concerns about officer and/or public safety, and that the search be ‘reasonably 
necessary’ to ensure the preservation of the officer and/or public safety.”
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The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were quashed and acquittals were entered. There 
was no need to address the accused’s s. 10 Charter 
arguments.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
POLICE EXCEED IMPLIED 
LICENCE TO KNOCK: SMELLING 
STINK BREACHED PRIVACY
R. v. Atkinson, 2012 ONCA 380
The accused entered an apartment 
uninvited through an open balcony 
door. The suite belonged to an 
acquaintance who she met at 
Cocaine Anonymous and lived in the 
same building. She refused to leave when asked, but 
grudgingly did so when the request was repeated. 
The next day the accused again entered the 
apartment uninvited, this time walking  into a 
bedroom and asking  for a “ten piece” of crack. She 
refused to leave when requested and had to be 
escorted out. Then, sometime during  the middle of 
the night, a burglar entered the apartment and the 
following  day a flat screen television was found 
missing. Feces was seen on a table beneath the 
balcony, on the balcony, and on the kitchen and 
living  room floors.! None of the footprints were 
closer than about three feet from where the 
television had been. 
Police attended the apartment and looked around, 
discovering  a lot of “dark feces”. It appeared 
someone had stepped in dog  feces left on the 
balcony of the apartment and proceeded to track it 
around.! The officer considered the accused as a 
person of interest, having  entered the apartment 
uninvited and unannounced the previous two days. 
However, he concluded he did not have reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe that she was the 
burglar. The officer went to the accused’s home, 
walked up to the door of the enclosed verandah/
mudroom and knocked. The accused answered the 
door and, when questioned, denied any knowledge 
of the television theft. The officer noticed a pair of 
black shoes close by with something  stuck to their 
bottom. He took a step or two inside, picked up the 
shoes, looked at them and lifted them towards his 
nose. He smelled feces. The accused acknowledged, 
but then quickly denied the shoes were hers. The 
shoes were seized and the accused was charged. The 
television was never recovered.
Ontario Court of Justice (trial)
The officer conceded that in order to 
smell the deposit stuck to the shoes he 
needed to pick them up. He considered 
he had an implied invitation to enter the 
verandah/mudroom and walked in without any 
objection from the accused. When the accused 
denied taking  the television she told the officer he 
could enter her house and showed him that the 
television was not there. The Crown conceded that 
the officer breached s. 8  of the Charter in seizing  the 
shoes and that they should be excluded as evidence. 
More on the Waterfield Doctrine
The English Waterfield or ancilliary powers doctrine is 
used to determine whether a police officer was acting 
lawfully at common law. The test has two branches:
• Whether the police conduct, which involved a prima 
facie unlawful interference with a person's liberty, fell 
within the general scope of any duty imposed by 
statute or recognized at common law, such as 
preventing life or protecting property? 
• Whether the police conduct, albeit within the 
general scope of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable 
use of powers associated with the duty? The 
interference with liberty must be necessary for the 
carrying out of the particular police duty and it must 
be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the 
liberty interfered with and the importance of the 
public purpose served by the interference.
Examples of its use:
• the power of investigative detention on the basis 
of a reasonable suspicion. R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52
• the power to forcibly enter a private home to 
investigate a 911 call and provide assistance to the 
caller. R. v. Godoy, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311
• the power to detain people (by stopping a vehicle) 
based on the existence of reasonable grounds to 
believe there were handguns in a public place, 
which posed a genuine risk to public safety. R. v. 
Clayton, 2007 SCC 32
• the power to use a sniffer-dog to search luggage 
on the basis of a “reasonable suspicion” standard. 
R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18
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Although the shoes themselves were excluded, the 
officer’s observations of the shoes, both visual and 
olfactory, were admitted and the accused was 
convicted of break and enter and two counts of 
unlawfully in a dwelling  house for the two earlier 
entries to the same apartment.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other grounds, that the officer’s 
observations in seeing  and 
smelling  the adherent fecal 
matter on the shoes were 
inadmissible. In her view, each 
observation amounted to a “search” 
under s. 8  of the Charter and lacked 
any s tatutory or common law 
authority.! There was no warrant or 
consent.! Further, the “plain view” 
doctrine, which only permits a seizure 
(not a search),  did not apply because 
the officer was not lawfully present in 
the verandah/mudroom. Nor was the 
feces either readily apparent or 
inadvertently discovered. The Crown, 
on the other hand, despite the trial 
concession of an unlawful seizure, 
now submitted that the officer was 
lawfully in the verandah/mudroom to 
pursue his burglary investigation and 
the!  material on the shoes was clearly 
visible from the entrance. Crown 
suggested the officer was entitled to pick up the 
shoes, look at the material and smell it. This was not 
an unreasonable search the Crown contended.
The officer’s initial approach to the home, his entry 
and his conduct in picking  up the shoes, looking  at 
them and smelling  them was both a search and a 
seizure the Court of Appeal concluded. And since 
there was no warrant, the onus shifted to the Crown 
to establish a lawful basis for the police action, 
which they failed to do. The officer exceeded the 
implied licence to knock doctrine, the accused gave 
no valid consent, nor was the plain view doctrine 
applicable. The officer’s observations of and about 
the material on the accused’s shoes breached s. 8  of 
the Charter.
The Door Knock
Like all members of the public, a police officer has 
an implied invitation to knock at a person’s door to 
facilitate communication with an occupant. This 
invitation to knock waives the privacy interest the 
occupant might otherwise have in the approach to 
the door of their home. Justice Watt, authoring  the 
unanimous Court of Appeal judgment, described it 
this way:
The common law recognizes an 
implied licence for all members of 
the public, including  police officers, 
to approach the door of a residence 
and to knock. Thus, an occupier is 
deemed to g rant the publ ic , 
including  the police, permission to 
approach the door and to knock.! 
Police who act in accordance with 
this implied invitation do not intrude 
on the occupant’s privacy. Unless 
rebutted by some clear expression of 
intent , the implied invi tat ion 
effectively waives the privacy interest 
that an individual might otherwise 
have in the approach to the door of 
his or her dwelling.
This implied invitation to knock 
extends no further than is required to 
permit convenient communication 
with the occupant of the dwelling. It follows that 
only those activities reasonably associated with 
the purpose of communicating with the 
occupant are authorized by the “implied 
licence” to knock.
Where state agents approach a dwelling  with the 
intention of gathering evidence against an 
occupant, they have exceeded any authority 
implied by the invitation to knock and become 
engaged in a search of the occupant’s home. 
Likewise, where police specifically advert to the 
possibility of securing  evidence against an 
accused by “knocking on the door”, they have 
exceeded the authority conferred on them by the 
implied licence to knock.
“The common law 
recognizes an implied 
licence for all members 
of the public, including 
police officers, to 
approach the door of a 
residence and to knock. 
Thus, an occupier is 
deemed to grant the 
public, including the 
police, permission to 
approach the door and 
to knock.”
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In some circumstances, police officers lawfully 
present at the door of a residence may lawfully 
enter the premises. An invitation to enter may be 
implied from the circumstances, for example 
from the words and conduct of a person in 
charge of the place. An implied invitation to 
enter furnishes lawful authority for the police to 
be in the residence or other place.
When determining whether to imply an 
invitation to enter a residence from the words 
and conduct of a homeowner in a brief 
interaction with a police officer, we should not 
lose sight of the dynamics of the police-citizen 
relationship. The essence of the policing function 
puts citizens on an uneven footing with police. 
We should not too readily imply an invitation to 
enter from the absence of objection or mere 
compliance, any more than we would equate 
consent with acquiescence or compliance in 
equivalent circumstances. [references omitted, 
paras. 45-49]
In this case, Justice Watt found the officer exceeded 
the boundaries of implied invitation to knock and 
engaged in a search of the accused’s home. 
Although the officer considered the accused a 
“person of interest” and did not have reasonable 
grounds to arrest, he asked questions and took 
action from which it could be reasonably inferred he 
“approached the home in the hope of obtaining 
evidence linking the accused to the burglary.”
Consent
The officer stepped into the enclosed verandah/
mudroom after claiming  he had an “implied 
invitation” to enter, suggesting  the accused offered 
no objection. But the evidentiary record was 
insufficient to support a finding  that the accused had 
an adequate informational basis upon which she 
could truly relinquish her right to privacy. Justice 
Watt described the issue of consent like this:
A consent search is lawful, thus reasonable.! A 
valid consent requires that the consenting party 
have the required informational foundation for a 
true relinquishment of the right.
The consent must be voluntary and informed. To 
be voluntary, the consent, which may be express 
or implied, must not be the product of police 
oppression, coercion or other conduct that 
negates the consenting  party’s freedom to choose 
whether to allow police to pursue the course of 
conduct requested or to deny them that right. To 
be informed, the consenting  party must be aware 
of
i.! the nature of the police conduct to which the 
consent relates;
ii. the right to refuse to permit the police to 
pursue the conduct; and
iii. the potential consequences of giving consent.
[references omitted, paras. 55-56]
Plain View
The common law “plain view” doctrine allows the 
warrantless seizure of things in plain view provided 
(1) the seizing  officer is lawfully in the place of 
seizure, (2) the evidentiary nature of the item is 
immediately apparent to the officer through the 
unaided use of their senses and (3) the evidence is 
discovered inadvertently. Here, however, the officer 
was not lawfully present and the plain view doctrine 
therefore did not apply.
!
s. 24(2) Charter
Despite the Charter breach the evidence was 
nonetheless admissible. The officer acted in good 
faith and the breach involved conduct comprising  a 
single brief transaction in an area of the premises 
which was outside the main living  area and visible 
from the entrance. The impact of the breach on the 
accused’s Charter-protected interests was minimal. 
Territorially, the area searched was a covered 
verandah/mudroom, not the main living  area of the 
residence, and entry was by a door that all members 
of the public had a licence to approach and knock. 
The shoes were visible from the doorway and the 
officer only needed to take a step or two, pick them 
up, look at them and smell the adherent material. 
Informationally, the unaided observations of sight 
and smell indicated that someone wearing  the shoes 
had stepped in feces. This revealed little about the 
“A consent search is lawful, thus reasonable.!A valid consent requires that the consenting party 
have the required informational foundation for a true relinquishment of the right.”
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intimate details of the accused’s lifestyle and 
personal choices and was nothing  more than a 
passerby could infer from a casual meeting  on a 
street corner.! Finally, the circumstantial evidence 
provided a link between the accused (her shoes) and 
the break and enter (the apartment).!
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
INTENTIONAL ACT CAN 
ESTABLISH NECESSARY RISK 
FOR CARE or CONTROL
R. v. Coleman, 2012 SKCA 65!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
After receiving  a complaint about a 
black or dark-coloured Jetta bearing 
a specific licence plate number 
being  driven in an erratic manner, 
police located it at about 10:30 pm 
parked on the side of the road. The keys were in the 
ignition, the engine was not running, its headlights 
were off and the accused was sleeping  in the driver’s 
seat. When an officer knocked on the window a 
couple of times, the accused awoke, mouthed the 
words “oh fuck”, reached toward the keys in the 
ignition with his right hand and put his left hand on 
the steering  wheel. The officer then opened the 
driver’s door of the vehicle to stop the accused from 
driving  and to speak with him. She detected a strong 
odour of alcohol and asked the accused several 
times for his driver’s licence and registration.! His 
speech was slurred and deliberate, and his 
movements were jerky.!He also fumbled getting  his 
licence and said that he had been at a bar. His! 
breath smelled of alcohol.!The accused was arrested 
and placed in the back of a police car where he 
promptly fell asleep.! He provided breath sampels 
over the legal limit and was subsequently charged 
with having  care or control while impaired by 
alcohol and over 80mg%.
!
Saskatchewan Provincial Court (trial)
!
The accused said he had two beers at the 
bar after work and then left at 6:30 pm to 
drive home. As he began to fall asleep he 
pulled over at about 7:00 pm to nap for 
about five minutes, but ended up sleeping  for three 
hours. He tried to explain the indicia of impairment 
observed by police but the judge disbelieved him. 
The judge concluded that the accused had been 
driving  as late as about 10:00 pm. His seat had been 
in an upright position, the vehicle had been pulled 
off the highway (not blocking  traffic) and was not 
otherwise in a dangerous position. The keys were in 
the ignition, the engine was not running, the 
emergency brake was engaged and the gearshift was 
s. 349(2) Presumption
In R. v. Atkinson, 2012 ONCA 380 the accused also argued 
that the trial judge failed to properly apply the statutory 
presumption of  intent in s. 349(2) of the Criminal Code. This 
presumption deems that an intruder who unlawfully 
enters!or is unlawfully present in a premise, absent evidence 
to the contrary, was there with the intent to commit an 
indictable offence. From the evidence of the actus reus, the 
judge presumes the mens  rea. The Court of  Appeal described 
the presumption as follows:
The presumption in s. 349(2) ... helps the Crown prove the 
requisite fault element, the intent to commit an indictable 
offence in the premises unlawfully entered. For the purposes 
of the subsection, “evidence to the contrary” is evidence, which 
may emerge from the Crown’s case or be adduced as part of 
the defence case, that is not disbelieved by the trier of fact 
and tends to negate the accused’s intention to commit  an 
indictable offence in the premises.
In prosecutions to which s. 349(2) applies and in which 
“evidence to the contrary” is given, the trial judge is required 
to consider that evidence, along with the rest of the evidence 
adduced at trial, in determining whether Crown counsel has 
proven the mens rea required for a conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt. [references omitted, paras.105-106]
And further:
To rebut the presumption of unlawful intent  in s. 349(2), 
“evidence to the contrary” must tend to show that the 
intruder or occupier had no intention of committing a crime 
in the premises.!As with any evidence adduced at trial, it is for 
the presiding judge to assess this evidence, to determine 
whether she or he believes all, some or none of it. If the 
“evidence to the contrary” is neither rejected nor disbelieved, 
it  falls to the Crown to prove the existence of the relevant 
intent  beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence taken as a 
whole. [reference omitted, para. 108]
Although there was evidence in the Crown’s case capable of 
amounting to “evidence to the contrary” within s. 349(2), the 
judge used circumstantial evidence of subsequent conduct as 
a basis upon which to infer a prior state of mind. The judge’s 
rejection of the “evidence to the contrary” left the 
presumption of unlawful intent intact and the Crown’s case 
unanswered.
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in neutral. Further, to put the car into motion the 
accused would have had to depress the clutch and 
shift into gear.!He also found that the accused had 
reached for the steering  wheel and key for the 
purpose of starting the vehicle.
!
Because the judge found that the accused had 
stopped his vehicle intending  to have a nap, the 
presumption in s. 258(1) of the Criminal Code had 
been displaced. However, on the whole of the 
evidence, the Crown had proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused had been in de 
facto, or actual, care or control of his car. In the 
judge’s view, the accused had used the fittings or 
equipment in an intoxicated state when he reached 
for the steering  wheel and key in the ignition. This 
constituted a risk of setting  his vehicle in motion so 
that it could become dangerous:
!
In this case, I accept that the accused was sitting 
upright in the driver's seat sleeping. When [the 
officer] woke him up he reached for the steering 
wheel and the key in the ignition to start the 
vehicle. It matters not whether it was inadvertent 
or intentional. The fact is, this is what he did and 
only the officer's quick response in opening  the 
car door stopped the accused from actually 
starting the vehicle.
!
The accused was convicted of care or control while 
impaired.
!
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
!
The accused successfully appealed his 
conviction. An appeal judge emphasized 
that the law should not discourage a 
drinking  driver from pulling  their vehicle 
off the road.!He concluded that the accused had not 
been in care or control of his vehicle. “In order to 
set the vehicle in motion, there would have had to 
have been numerous steps taken,” said the judge. “In 
sum, the accused was simply sleeping  in his car and 
it was completely turned off. … [I]t cannot be 
reasonably said that the accused was engaged in the 
process of the use of the fittings or equipment of the 
vehicle. There was no risk of inadvertently setting  the 
vehicle in motion.” The accused’s conviction was 
overturned and a not guilty verdict was substituted.
!
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
!
A further appeal by the Crown was 
successful. Just ice Richards, 
delivering  the opinion of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, 
noted that care or control was defined by the 
Supreme Court of Canada nearly 30 years ago in R. 
v. Toews, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 119 as: “acts of care or 
control, short of driving, are acts which involve 
some use of the car or its fittings and equipment, or 
some course of conduct associated with the vehicle 
which would involve a risk of putting  the vehicle in 
motion so that it could become dangerous.” Since 
then, Justice Richards opined, the case law has 
“emphasized that the central consideration in 
relation to ‘care and control’ is the risk that the 
accused person will create a dangerous situation, 
whether by putting  the vehicle in motion or some 
other way.” He continued:
!
The relevant risk does not relate solely to the 
possibility of an impaired driver acting 
inadvertently to put a vehicle in motion.! It also 
includes the possibility of such a driver acting 
intentionally in this regard.! The reason for this is 
self-evident.! Impaired drivers have a diminished 
capacity to make safe judgments. They 
frequently act, deliberately, in ways which 
endanger themselves and the public. [para. 24]
!
The Queen’s Bench judge had focused exclusively 
on the question of whether the accused might have 
inadvertently put his vehicle in motion without 
considering  the risk of him making  a deliberate 
decision to drive:
!
Significantly, this is not a case where a driver, 
realizing he is impaired, decides to pull off the 
road in order to avoid endangering  himself or 
“The relevant risk does not relate solely to the possibility of an impaired driver acting 
inadvertently to put a vehicle in motion.!It also includes the possibility of such a driver acting 
intentionally in this regard.”
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the public.!To the contrary, [the accused] denied 
having  been intoxicated and testified that he had 
consumed only two beers some four hours 
before being  awakened by the police.! He said 
he had pulled over, not because he was drunk, 
but because he was sleepy.!He did not intend to 
park until he had sobered up.!Rather, he said he 
had merely paused on his way home for a “five-
minute nap”. All of this demonstrates that [the 
accused’s] course of conduct posed a genuine 
risk to the public.!He was behind the wheel of 
his car and he was of a mind to deliberately put 
it in motion even though he was impaired. The 
learned Queen’s Bench judge appears to have 
overlooked or given no consideration to this key 
fact.
!
The risk that [the accused] would deliberately 
have chosen to drive is underlined by his actions 
on being awakened by the police.!As found by 
the trial judge, [the accused] “reached for the 
steering wheel and the key in the ignition to start 
the vehicle” and “only the officer’s quick 
response in opening the door stopped him from 
actually starting the vehicle.”! This, too, confirms 
in clear terms the risk to the public posed by the 
possibility of [the accused] making  a deliberate 
decision to drive his vehicle.
!
... The answer to the care and control question 
does not turn merely on whether a driver starts a 
vehicle or is behind the wheel of a vehicle with 
a running  motor. Indeed, an intention to drive is 
not a necessary element of the offence created 
by s. 253(1). As counsel ultimately conceded, 
the proper analysis of the point turns on an 
assessment of the full constellation of factors 
relevant to the risk of the accused putting the 
vehicle in motion or otherwise creating a danger 
to the public.! As the Supreme Court said in 
Toews, there must be “some course of conduct” 
in relation to the vehicle which could create a 
danger.
!
Here, [the accused] did pull off the highway and 
park on a side road. He did turn off the engine 
of his vehicle, engage the emergency brake and 
go to sleep.!But, on the other hand, he denied or 
did not understand that he was impaired. He 
stopped only for a five minute nap. He did not 
recline his seat. He left the keys in the ignition 
and he tried to start his vehicle on being 
awakened by the police. As a result, the trial 
judge made no error in weighing  the collective 
significance of these considerations so as to find 
[the accused] guilty on the s. 253(1) charge. 
[reference omitted, paras. 28-31]
!
Finally, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the 
Queen’s Bench judge in finding  that, for policy 
reasons, s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code should be 
interpreted or applied so as not to penalize impaired 
drivers who pull their vehicles off the road:
In my respectful view, this line of thinking 
cannot be accepted. The legislative objective 
behind s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code is clear. In 
light of the obvious dangers involved in mixing 
motor vehicles and alcohol, Parliament made it 
an offence for an individual, whose ability to 
operate a motor vehicle is impaired by alcohol, 
to be in care and control of a vehicle. The idea, 
it seems to me, was to wholly avoid having 
intoxicated individuals in positions where they 
can put vehicles in motion (or otherwise 
endanger the public) in the first place. It was not 
to create an incentive for drunk drivers to pull 
over.!
!
Accordingly, I conclude that the Queen’s Bench 
judge erred by analyzing the issues before him 
with a view to giving effect to the policy idea 
that s. 253(1) of the Code should not be applied 
so as to penalize impaired drivers who take their 
vehicles off the road. An impaired person behind 
the wheel of a parked vehicle might pose a less 
acute danger to the public than an impaired 
person behind the wheel of a moving vehicle.! 
But, that does not mean the latter situation is risk 
free. Parliament has attempted to address both 
issues by aiming criminal sanctions not just at 
those individuals who drive while impaired, but 
also at those who assume care and control of a 
vehicle while impaired. Section 253(1) of the 
Criminal Code is directed at the very root of the 
impaired driving problem. Its object is to stop 
intoxicated or otherwise impaired individuals 
from endangering themselves and the public by 
having  care or control of a motor vehicle. 
[reference omitted, paras. 33-34]
!
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the accused’s 
conviction was reinstated.!
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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TANGENTIAL DETENTION 
REQUIRES RIGHT TO COUNSEL
R. v. MacDonald, 2012 ONCA 495
!
Shortly after midnight police officers 
stopped the accused’s van after 
clocking  it on radar travelling  at 121 
km/h in a 90 km/h zone. One officer 
approached the accused (on the 
driver’s side) while a second officer approached the 
passenger side where he observed, through the 
passenger-side window, a brown cardboard box in 
the large open area at the back of the van. The box 
was about 20” x 10” x 14” and had some lettering 
on it which aroused suspicions that the box 
contained contraband cigarettes. When asked what 
was in the box, the accused initially said he did not 
know but when asked again said it contained 
cigarettes. Police called a senior investigator at the 
provincial Ministry of Revenue, to obtain 
authorization to detain and search the vehicle 
pursuant to s. 24(1) of Ontario’s Tobaco Tax Act 
(TTA). The revenue investigator concluded that there 
were reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
that the vehicle contained evidence of a TTA 
contravention, and granted authorization to detain 
and search the van and seize any products or 
paperwork relating  to the purchase, sale and 
transportation of cigarettes. A police search revealed 
a bag  containing  310 grams of marijuana and a 
fanny pack containing  $4,872.75 in cash. The 
cardboard box contained 50 plastic bags, each 
containing  200 unmarked cigarettes. The accused 
was charged with offences which included 
possessing  marihuana for the purpose of trafficking 
under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(CDSA) and possessing  more than 200 unmarked 
cigarettes under the TTA.
!
Ontario Court of Justice (trial)
!
The accused argued that his Charter  rights 
were violated, including  ss. 8  and 10. But 
the trial judge found there was no search 
when the police asked the accused about 
the contents of the box. The judge also found the 
authorization to search provided by the revenue 
investigator was valid. In his view, the information 
available was “sufficient, on the subjective and 
objective standard, to support reasonable and 
probable grounds of an infraction under the Tobacco 
Tax Act.” As for s. 10, the judge found that the 
accused was detained under the TTA when the 
officer walked back to the police cruiser with the 
intent of seeking  authorization to search the van 
pursuant to s. 24(1). Although he should have 
advised the accused that he was being  detained 
under the TTA and of his rights under s. 10, it was of 
no consequence because no evidence was collected 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 24(1) of Ontario’s Tobacco Tax Act
s. 24 (1)!For any purpose relating to the 
administration and enforcement of this 
Act and the regulations, any person 
authorized for the purpose by the 
Minister who has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that the vehicle, trailer 
attached to a vehicle, vessel, railway equipment on 
rails or aircraft contains evidence of any 
contravention of this Act,
(a) may, without warrant, stop and detain any 
vehicle, including  any trailer attached to the vehicle, 
any vessel, railway equipment on rails or aircraft;
(b) may examine the contents thereof including  any 
cargo, manifests, records, accounts, vouchers, papers 
or things that may afford evidence as to the 
contravention of this Act or the regulations;
(c) subject to subsections (2), (2.2) and (2.4), may 
seize and take away any of the manifests, records, 
accounts, vouchers, papers or things and retain them 
until they are produced in any court proceedings; 
and
(d) may use any investigative technique, procedure or 
test that is, in the person’s opinion, necessary to 
determine whether cigarettes found during a 
detention are marked or stamped in accordance with 
this Act and the regulations.
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pursuant to that breach. The accused was convicted 
and was sentenced to four months in jail plus 12 
months probation for the CDSA conviction and 
given a $4,205 fine for the TTA conviction.
!
Ontario Court of Appeal
!
The accused appealed his CDSA 
conviction arguing, among  other 
grounds, that the questions about 
the ca rdboard box was an 
unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter and 
triggered a requirement that the police inform him 
about his rights under s. 10. Furthermore, he 
submitted that the judge erred in 
finding  the authorization under the 
TTA proper. In the accused’s view, 
his utterances, the marihuana and 
the cigarettes ought to have been 
excluded under s. 24(2).
!
TTA Search
!
Justice MacPherson, delivering  the 
Court’s opinion, concluded that the search was 
properly authorized under s. 24 of the TTA. There 
was sufficient information provided by police to the 
revenue investigator to furnish the requisite 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a 
search of the van would produce evidence of a TTA 
contravention. Plus, as the trial judge concluded, the 
officer was properly authorized in law to receive 
sub-delegated power from the revenue investigator 
to conduct the search.
!
Detention
!
Justice MacPherson concluded that the accused’s “s. 
10 Charter rights crystallized when the nature of the 
questioning  shifted towards a TTA investigation”.! 
Generally, a person is detained when they are 
stopped by police for a highway related infraction, 
but the need to advise them of their s. 10(b) Charter 
right to counsel is suspended as a reasonable limit 
under s. 1. “The case law makes it clear that a 
roadside stop of a vehicle for possible violations of 
the Criminal Code (e.g. impaired driving) or 
provincial regulatory offences under statutes like the 
[Highway Traffic Act (HTA)] (e.g. speeding) is a 
detention,” said Justice MacPherson. “Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court of Canada held … that the 
implicit limitation on the s. 10(b) right to counsel 
that is inherent to roadside stops was justifiable 
under s. 1 of the Charter.”
!
So in this case, the accused was detained for the 
speeding  infraction under the HTA, remained 
detained and was not free to leave the scene until 
this process was completed. However, when the 
officer questioned the accused about the contents of 
the box—related to his suspicion that it contained 
illegal cigarettes—the accused was placed in a new 
jeopardy under the TTA which triggered his s. 10 
right to consult counsel. Because he was detained 
under the HTA and he could not leave 
the scene he could reasonably be 
expected to feel compelled to respond 
to questions from the police. “Before 
answering  the question, which had 
nothing  to do with his speeding  offence, 
he should have been advised of his right 
to consult counsel” the Court said in 
holding a s. 10(b) Charter breach.
!
s. 24(2) Charter
!
Although the Charter breach was not serious — the 
officer was not involved in a fishing  expedition nor 
was the single question particularly intrusive — and 
the evidence reliable, the impact on the accused’s 
Charter protected interests favoured exclusion. There 
is a general rule that statements taken in breach of 
the Charter will be excluded. “Since the police 
officers would not have had reasonable and 
probable grounds to search the van without the 
[accused’s] answer to the question about the 
contents of the box, it follows that the marijuana and 
cigarettes would not have been found by the police 
had the [accused] not made the self-incriminating 
response,” said the Court. The accused’s answer to 
the question, the marijuana and the cigarettes were 
inadmissible. The accused’s appeal was allowed and 
an acquittal on the charge of possessing  marijuana 
for the purpose of trafficking  was entered. The TTA 
charge was subject to a separate appeal route.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“s. 10 Charter rights 
crystallized when the 
nature of the 
questioning shifted 
towards a TTA 
investigation.”
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COMMANDS TO SHOW HANDS & 
GET OUT OF VEHICLE NOT A DE 
FACTO ARREST
R. v. Madore & Madeira, 2012 BCCA 160
Police officers became suspicious 
after they saw the accused Madore, 
believed to be a high-level marihuana 
trafficker, drive his truck 
onto a logging  road. 
They stopped a logging  truck on the 
road and spoke to its driver, receiving 
more information that increased their 
suspicions. They drove a short distance 
up the logging  road and saw Madore’s 
truck parked just off the roadway. 
Madore, holding  a bag, was standing 
near the open passenger door of a Jeep 
Cherokee which was occupied by the 
accused Madeira sitting  in its driver’s seat.! Police 
stopped their cars and got out quickly. One of the 
officers , with her gun drawn in the ready position at 
her hip, directed Madore to show his hands, drop 
the bag  he was holding  and arrested him. Madeira 
was ordered out of the Jeep by another officer, who 
opened the driver’s door and detected the odour of 
“freshly harvested marihuana bud”.!  In the process, 
Madeira threw a cell phone or PDA out of the 
vehicle’s window. He was also arrested. Police found 
20 kg  of marihuana (the bulk of it in the rear of the 
Jeep and some in the bag  Madore had dropped upon 
his initial detention) and $105,455 in the Jeep.
British Columbia Provincial Court (trial)
The judge found that both men had been 
arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of the 
Charter when the officers got out of their 
vehicles and gave directions to them. The 
police lacked both subjective and objective grounds 
to arrest or detain the men. However, the judge did 
not go so far as to hold the detentions amounted to 
de facto arrests and admitted the evidence under s. 
24(2). The trial judge ruled that Madeira had been 
arbitrarily detained, but lawfully arrested. The smell 
of marihuana was admitted under s. 24(2) against 
Madiera and provided the reasonable grounds 
necessary to believe he had committed an indictable 
offence. The arrest being  lawful permitted a search 
incidental to that arrest.
As for Madore, he had been arbitrarily detained 
which was prolonged and turned into an unlawful 
arrest. The judge rejected the testimony of the officer 
arresting  Madore that she had smelled marihuana 
and found she did not have reasonable grounds. She 
was an experienced police officer and 
knew the importance of making 
personal notes, but failed to make a 
note or reference to smell ing 
marihuana before arresting  Madore in 
either the report to Crown counsel or 
in the ITO. The evidence found in the 
vehicle and the bag  was nevertheless 
admitted. In the judge’s view, Madore 
would have been lawfully arrested 
anyways following  the search of 
Madiera. Both men were convicted of possessing 
marihuana exceeding  three kilograms for the 
purpose of trafficking.
 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accuseds argued that the trial 
judge erred in refusing  to exclude 
evidence that was obtained in 
violation of the Charter breaches. 
Several arguments were made including:
 
•!A Layered s. 24(2)  Approach: the trial judge 
distinguished between evidence obtained by 
the police prior to the accuseds’ initial 
detention and evidence obtained after their 
detention. He relied on the former to afford 
reasonable and probable grounds for the 
accuseds’ arrest; 
• De facto arrest: the trial judge did not 
characterize Madeira’s initial detention as an 
arrest; and
•!Search: the trial judge found the opening  of 
the Jeep’s door did not violate Madeira’s 
rights under s. 8 of the Charter.
“An arrest is a more 
serious infringement of 
personal liberty than a 
detention, and it 
requires a more 
compelling justification 
on the part of police.”
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 s. 24(2) Layered Approach
The accuseds submitted that the trial judge 
improperly conducted two discrete inquiries under 
s. 24(2). The first enquiry being  the admissibility of 
the sensory observations (smell) made after the 
initial unlawful detentions, which formed the 
grounds for Madiera’s lawful arrest. The second 
being  the admissibility of the real evidence found in 
the Jeep and Madore’s bag. In the accuseds view, the 
judge should have made a single, comprehensive 
consideration of all the Charter breaches together 
r a t h e r t h a n d i s c o n n e c t i n g  t h e i r i n i t i a l 
unconstitutional detentions from the ultimate 
decision to admit or exclude the evidence. But the 
Court of Appeal disagreed. “The smell of marihuana 
in the air was not obtained illegally,” said Chief 
Justice Finch. “The judge made no error in 
concluding  that Mr. Madeira’s arrest, and the search 
incidental to that arrest, were not unlawful.”
De Facto Arrest
On a s. 24(2) analysis, whether an accused was 
arrested, or merely detained, can be a significant 
factor. “An arrest is a more serious infringement of 
personal liberty than a detention, and it requires a 
more compelling  justification on the part of police,” 
said Chief Justice Finch. “In cases such as this one, 
where police lacked sufficient grounds to detain, 
they would necessarily have had even less basis to 
carry out an arrest. In this sense, an arbitrary de 
facto arrest should weigh more heavily than an 
arbitrary detention within the s. 24(2) analysis.”
Here, there was no de facto arrest. “The facts of the 
present case disclose no such categorical attempt to 
take the [accuseds] into custody,” said the Court.! 
“[The officer] told Mr. Madore to show his hands, 
while [another officer] directed Mr. Madeira to get 
out of the car.!Such commands are more consistent 
with an effort to prevent the [accuseds] from taking 
any immediate action than with putting  them under 
arrest.”!!Thus, the initial detention was not a de facto 
arrest.
Search
A person alleging  a Charter breach must prove it on 
a balance of probabilities. In this case, Madiera did 
not lead any evidence that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the Jeep. Although he was 
found in it, he offered no evidence about who 
owned it or that he had the permission of the owner 
to occupy it. Rather, he suggested he had no 
relationship with it. 
The Charter appeal was dismissed but Madore’s 
conviction for possessing  marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking  was substituted with a simple 
possession conviction. There was no evidence that 
the weight of the marihuana he dropped exceeded 
three kilograms. Police never weighed the 
marihuana in the bag  separately from the marihuana 
in the Jeep and the Crown failed to prove both men 
controlled all the marihuana together.!
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
FACT FOUND IN SENTENCING 
HEARING DID NOT ESTOP 
CROWN FROM PROCEEDING
R. v. Punko & Potts, 2012 SCC 39
After a multi-faceted, multi-year 
police investigation into the activities 
of the East End Chapter of the Hells 
Angels, a number of criminal 
offences were prosecuted. Some of 
the offences fell within the jurisdiction of the 
provincial Crown, while others fell to the federal 
Crown. The provincial Crown proceeded first against 
the accuseds Punko and Potts, among  others, on 
charges of extortion, uttering  threats, counselling 
mischief, and unlawful possession of explosive 
substances and firearms. Some of the offences were 
allegedly committed for the benefit of, at the 
“[W]here police lacked sufficient grounds to detain, they would necessarily have had even less 
basis to carry out an arrest. In this sense, an arbitrary de facto arrest should weigh more heavily 
than an arbitrary detention within the s. 24(2) analysis.”
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direction of, or in association with a criminal 
organization, namely the Hells Angels. Following  a 
10 month trial on the provincial charges, a jury 
found each accused guilty of a number of offences. 
However, all men were acquitted of the criminal 
organization counts. Meanwhile, the federal Crown 
also initiated various drug-related offences, 
including  methamphetamine production and 
trafficking, and it was again alleged that they had 
done so for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with a criminal organization.
 
British Columbia Supreme Court
On the federal prosecution the accuseds 
made pre-trial motions arguing  that the 
Crown should be estopped from leading 
evidence that the Hells Angels was a 
criminal organization because the issue had already 
been decided by the jury in the provincial 
prosecution. The motions were granted and the 
judge held that the Crown should be estopped from 
seeking  to prove that the Hells Angels was a 
criminal organization in the federal case.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the Supreme 
Court ruling  which was overturned 
and a new trial was ordered. 
Justice Kirkpatrick, writing  for the 
court, found the jury’s verdict did not necessarily 
result from a finding  that the Hell’s Angels were not 
a criminal organization. Instead, individual jurors 
may have reached their decisions on the verdict by 
different routes. 
Supreme Court of Canada
The accuseds then 
appealed to Canada’s 
highest Court. They 
argued that the Crown 
was estopped from seeking  to prove the East End 
Chapter of the Hell’s Angels was a criminal 
organization. In their view, the earlier jury trial 
resulting  from the provincial prosecution already 
decided the issue when it returned a verdict of 
acquittal on the criminal organization counts. 
Issue Estoppel
The doctrine of issue estoppel is part of Canadian 
criminal law but it is to be narrowly applied. Not 
every issue raised in a previous trial will be the 
subject of issue estoppel. “The Crown is precluded 
from relitigating  only those issues that were decided 
in favour of the accused at the earlier trial,” said 
Justice Deschamps on behalf of the Court. 
“Moreover, the resolution of an issue in favour of the 
accused must be ‘a necessary inference from the 
trial judge’s findings or from the fact of the 
acquittal’.” Where there was a jury trial, the finding 
in favour of the accused must be logically necessary 
to the verdict of acquittal. But if there is more than 
one logical explanation for a jury’s verdict, the 
verdict cannot successfully be relied on in support 
of issue estoppel if one of these explanations did not 
depend on the jury resolving  the relevant issue in 
favour of the accused.!
 
In this case, the trial judge “erred in law in drawing 
inferences on a balance of probabilities — a 
question of burden of proof — rather than 
considering  whether a finding  regarding  the criminal 
nature of the organization was logically necessary to 
the acquittal — a question of logic and law.” The 
original jury acquitted the accused on all the 
criminal organization counts. This did not, however, 
mean that the jury must have found that the Hells 
Angels was not a criminal organization. Rather, two 
distinct defences had been raised and therefore 
there were at least two logical explanations for the 
not guilty verdict on each of the criminal 
organization counts:
What is the doctrine of issue estoppel? 
In Canadian criminal law, issue estoppel merely  ensures 
that an accused will not be required to answer questions 
that have already  been determined in his or her favour. It 
prevents relitigation of an issue that was decided in the 
accused’s favour in a prior trial and serves three purposes:
1. fairness to the accused who should not be called 
upon to answer questions already  determined in his 
or her favour; 
2. the integrity and coherence of the criminal law; and
3. the institutional values of judicial finality  and 
economy.
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1. the Crown had failed to prove that the Hells 
Angels was a criminal organization;!and
2. none of the substantive offences were 
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, 
or in association with the Hells Angels.
Thus, a judge could not infer from the verdict that 
the jurors necessarily found the Hells Angels was not 
a criminal organization. There were alternate routes 
to the verdict. “In a multi-issue jury trial, it will be 
rare for an acquittal to ground issue estoppel,” said 
Justice Deschamps. “Such an acquittal will often 
have more than one possible basis and different 
jurors may have reached a unanimous verdict by 
different routes.” Nor could findings of fact made by 
the judge for the purpose of sentencing  be relied 
upon to support issue estoppel.
A Slightly Different View
Justice Fish agreed with the reasons of the 
majority but would not foreclose the 
possibility that, as a matter of principle, a 
factual finding  made by a sentencing 
judge could never estop the Crown from relitigating 
an issue in a subsequent proceeding.! “To constrain 
the doctrine as my colleague does is to create the 
possibility of conflicting  judicial determinations, 
each purporting  to be final, and each made in 
proceedings between the same parties,” he said. 
“Where the earlier finding  was made in the 
accused’s favour, it is precisely this sort of 
inconsistency that damages the integrity and 
coherence of the criminal justice system.” 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
SOMETHING MORE THAN BALD 
STATEMENT NEEDED TO 
ESTABLISH IMPRACTICABILITY
R. v. Scott, 2012 BCCA 99
After receiving  an anonymous tip 
from a source of unknown reliability 
about a marihuana grow operation at 
the accused’s rural property, police 
investigated further and an officer 
prepared an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search 
warrant. He applied for a telewarrant on the 
understanding  that “there is no Justice of the Peace 
in Princeton.” When executing  the warrant police 
searched three buildings on the property: a mobile 
home, a cabin and a large shed divided in two. They 
found 13 mature marihuana plants, 583 marihuana 
clones and over 8,500 grams of dried marihuana 
valued between $126,245 and $229,505, depending 
on how it was marketed. When the accused’s mobile 
home was searched they found receipts for 
chemicals and fertilizer used for the grow operation, 
as well as growing instructions. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused challenged the telewarrant, 
in part, alleging  the preconditions for its 
issue had not been satisfied. But the trial 
judge dismissed the accused’s application 
to quash the warrant. The officer had an honest 
belief that there was no justice available in 
Princeton. Moreover, there was no evidence to the 
contrary and Princeton was a remote community 
with judges infrequently attending  there. Since the 
warrant was valid, it was unnecessary to embark on 
a s.! 24(2) Charter analysis. The evidence was 
admissible and the accused was convicted of 
producing  marihuana and possessing  it for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among  other 
grounds, that the conditions for a 
telewarrant were not met. Under s. 
487.1 of the Criminal Code a 
peace officer, when submitting  a request for a 
telewarrant, is required to establish it was 
impracticable to appear personally before a justice 
to obtain the warrant. Further, this section requires 
the officer to include in the ITO “a statement of the 
circumstances that make it impracticable.” Was the 
statement “there is no Justice of the Peace in 
Princeton” sufficient to fulfill this requirement? 
Justice Neilson, speaking  for the Court, concluded 
that it was. 
“A bald statement as to the unavailability of a justice 
will not suffice as a statement of the circumstances 
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creating  impracticability,” she said. “There must be 
something  more to permit the issuing  justice to 
assess the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that 
an application for a warrant in the usual course is 
impracticable.” This requirement may be met by a 
statement that establishes there are no justices 
available in the community where the officer is 
posted. The officer testified it was always his practice 
to check a board posted at the detachment that 
identifies dates on which Provincial Court regularly 
sits in Princeton. Plus, the issuing  justice or the 
reviewing  justice may take judicial notice of 
concrete local circumstances in assessing  the 
adequacy of the officer’s statement.
Here, the trial judge noted the closest resident judge 
was located in Penticton, 112 km away, and the 
Provincial Court sat in Princeton only several days 
each month. The trial judge found the officer 
honestly believed there wasn’t a judge or a justice of 
the peace available in Princeton and there was no 
evidence that there was in fact a justice available. 
The officer’s statement that “there is no Justice of the 
Peace in Princeton” was facially sufficient to satisfy 
s. 487.1(4)(a). The amplification evidence, although 
not to be used to strengthen the Crown’s position, 
indicated that the officer “undertook inquiries about 
the availability of a justice and his statement as to 
impracticability was not simply boilerplate.” The 
amplification evidence distinguished this case from 
other situations where a failure to comply with s. 
487.1(4)(a) had been demonstrated. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
OTHER ASSERTIONS & THEIR OUTCOMES
“because there is no available justice locally” without any 
inquiry as to the availability of a justice in Grand Forks, BC nor 
any effort to explain in the ITO why it was impracticable to  travel 
to a nearby community to appear in person before another justice 
was fatal to the telewarrant: R. v. Ling, 2009 BCCA 70; see also 
“local justice not available” insufficient: R. v. Smith, 2005 
BCCA 334. “there are no Judicial Justices of the Peace or 
Judges available” without evidence that a justice would have 
been available  in a community near Trail, BC was not sufficient to 
communicate the impracticability of appearing in person: R. v. 
Farewell, 2006 BCSC 372
“there is no Justice of the Peace in the community before 
whom I may appropriately make this application in person” 
went beyond simply stating a justice was unavailable and made it 
clear there was no justice in the community. This was sufficient: 
R. v. Berry, 202 BCSC 1742
“because there is no local J.P. services available” with 
amplification evidence the nearest justice from Kimberley, BC 
was 30 km away in Cranbrook, BC met the s. 487.1 
requirements. The trial judge was entitled to take judicial notice 
that the two communities were separated by rugged unorganized 
territory: R. v. Erickson, 2002 BCSC 785
Lesson learned = explain why you believe no 
justice is available in the ITO
BY THE BOOK:
s. 487.1 Criminal Code
s.  487.1! (1)! Where a peace officer believes 
that an indictable offence has been 
commi t t ed and  tha t i t  wou ld be 
impracticable to appear personally before a 
justice  to make application for a warrant in 
accordance with section 256  or 487, the peace officer may 
submit  an information on oath by telephone or other 
means of telecommunication to a justice designated for the 
purpose by the chief judge of the provincial court having 
jurisdiction in the matter.
(4)!An information submitted by telephone or other means 
of telecommunication shall include
(a)! a statement of the circumstances that make it 
impracticable for the peace officer to appear personally 
before a justice;
“A bald statement as to the unavailability of a justice will not suffice as a statement of the 
circumstances creating impracticability. There must be something more to permit the issuing 
justice to assess the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that an application for a warrant in 
the usual course is impracticable.”
.... ... ...
.... ... ...
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OFFICER HAD NO GREATER 
EXPERTISE THAN JUDGE
R. v. Cranham, 2012 ONCA 457
!
A plain clothes detective observed a 
drug  trafficker from a distance of two 
to three feet while a drug  transaction 
took place. Another officer, some 60 
to 70 feet away, took surveillance 
photographs and made notes describing  the 
trafficker as 45-years-old, wearing  blue jeans, a long 
black parka, a black toque and black sunglasses. The 
trafficker's hair was not visible in the surveillance 
photographs. Later that day, the detective confirmed 
that the individual in the surveillance photographs 
was the trafficker. A bench warrant for the accused, 
who resembled the person in the surveillance 
photograph, was issued. The arresting  officer who 
took the accused into custody three days after the 
offence “believed” and was “pretty certain” or 
“certain” that the accused was also the trafficker in 
the surveillance photographs. At the time of arrest 
the accused was wearing  big  square sunglasses and 
his cheeks were sunken. However, neither the 
detective nor the photographing  officer was shown a 
line-up with the accused. Nor did they confirm he 
was the trafficker in the surveillance photographs at 
this time.
!
Ontario Court of Justice (trial)
!
The plain clothes detective identified the 
accused in court as the trafficker he 
observed some nine months earlier. He 
noted that the accused had gained some 
weight and his cheeks, which were a little bit sunken 
at the time of the offence, where a little fuller. He 
also was confident that his ability to make an in-
court identification was not compromised because 
the trafficker wore a toque and large sunglasses 
during  the offence. The detective had not recorded 
in his notes, nor did he remember, that the trafficker 
had worn a toque. Further, his notes also indicated 
the trafficker wore a leather jacket, not a long  parka 
as indicated in the surveillance photos. As well, the 
accused’s hair was dirty blond and not brown as 
recorded by the detective. The officer taking  the 
surveillance photographs testified that he was certain 
that the accused was the trafficker, even though he 
said he was thinner during  the offence. This officer 
also agreed that the accused had a light blue tattoo 
on his left hand but no tattoo was visible on the left 
hand of the trafficker in the surveillance 
photographs. The arresting  officer also testified that 
the accused was heavier than at the time of his 
arrest.
!
The judge was unable to identify the accused as the 
trafficker captured in the surveillance photographs. 
“For me to even consider finding  him guilty on the 
basis of my personal observation and what I see in 
the photographs, would be a total miscarriage of 
justice,” he said. But the judge went on to accept the 
evidence of the officers and relied on their opinion 
that the accused was the trafficker. “Police officers 
are more highly trained to make observations of 
circumstances, that is, surrounding  circumstances, 
individuals who are involved (in) life-style activities 
than the average citizen, especially officers with any 
period of training,” he said. “These officers stated, 
every one of them, as they stood, or sat here in the 
witness box, they had no difficulty in identifying  [the 
accused] as the person in the photographs, and 
therefore, the person who was involved in the 
transaction.” The judge found identify had been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused 
was convicted of trafficking  twenty dollars of crack 
cocaine.
!
Ontario Court of Appeal
!
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in relying  on the 
opinions of the officers that he was 
the trafficker in the surveillance 
photographs when the judge was unable to do so 
himself based on his own observations. In-dock 
identification is to be given very little weight 
because of its inherent frailties, particularly where 
the person identified is a stranger to the witness. 
“Many wrongful convictions have resulted from faulty eyewitness testimony. Identification 
findings are subject to closer appellate scrutiny than other findings of fact.”
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“Many wrongful convictions have resulted from 
faulty eyewitness testimony,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “Identification findings are subject to closer 
appellate scrutiny than other findings of fact.”
!
In this case, the Appeal Court found “there was no 
basis for concluding  that [the police officers] had 
any greater expertise, particular advantage, or 
special knowledge, in identifying  whether the 
[accused] was the trafficker in the surveillance 
photographs.” The arresting  officer did not know the 
accused and had not observed the trafficker before 
the arrest. The officer did not make notes about what 
the accused was wearing  at the time of arrest and no 
photograph of him at the time of his arrest was 
offered as evidence. The photographing  surveillance 
officer did not know or recognize the trafficker and 
was at too great a distance to observe him. The plain 
clothes detective, who was in a position to observe 
the trafficker, also did not know or recognize him. 
Although the detective confirmed the person in the 
surveillance photographs was the trafficker, he only 
briefly saw him once some nine months before 
court. He did not remember that the trafficker wore 
a toque and some of his observations were 
inaccurate. The trial judge, by relying  on the 
opinions of the officers despite his own conclusion 
that he could not identify the accused as the 
trafficker, gave more weight to the very in-dock 
identification that he had cautioned should be given 
very little weight. The accused’s appeal was allowed 
and his conviction was quashed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
NEW ARREST POWER FOR 
BREACHING PAROLE
On June 13, 2012 the Corrections and Conditional 
Release Act (CCRA) was amended, adding  a new 
power for a peace officer to arrest an offender 
without a warrant for breaching  a condition of their 
release. How is this new? Prior to June 13, a peace 
officer could only arrest an offender without warrant 
if they believed on reasonable grounds that there 
was a warrant of apprehension for the offender. An 
“offender” is a person sentenced to a penitentiary 
but outside of it by reason of parole, statutory 
release or unescorted temporary absence (UTA). 
Now police do not need to rely on the existence of a 
warrant. Police can arrest an offender who has 
committed a breach of their parole, statutory release 
or UTA or the police find an offender committing  a 
breach.
!
This is not a new offence like breach of probation or 
breach of bail, so there is no new charge attached to 
this provision. It is merely an arrest authority. Once 
an arrest is made, police will then need contact 
parole authorities to determine whether the offender 
will be recommitted to custody and serve the 
remaining unexpired portion of their sentence. 
Note-able Quote
“Great minds discuss ideas; ordinary minds 
discuss events; small-minds discuss other people.” 
- author unknown
BY THE BOOK:
s. 137.1 Corrections and Conditional Release Act
Arrest without warrant - breach of conditions
A peace officer may arrest without warrant 
an offender who has committed a breach 
of a condition of their parole, statutory 
release or unescorted temporary absence, 
or whom the peace o f f icer f inds 
committing such a breach, unless the peace officer
(a) believes on reasonable grounds that the public 
interest may be satisfied without arresting the person, 
having regard to all the circumstances including the 
need to
(i) establish the identity of the person, or
(ii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the breach; 
and
(b) does not believe on  reasonable grounds that the 
person will fail to report to their parole supervisor in 
order to be dealt with according  to law if the peace 
officer does not arrest the person.
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2011 POLICE REPORTED CRIME
In July 2012 Statistics Canada 
released its “Police reported 
crime statistics in Canada, 
2011” report. Highlights of this 
recent collection of crime data 
include:
• there were 1,984,916 crimes (excluding  traffic) 
reported to Canadian police in 2011; this 
represents 109,959 fewer crimes reported when 
compared to 2010.
• the total crime rate dropped -6%. This includes a 
violent crime rate drop of -4% and a property 
crime rate drop of -8%.
YK
T-159.2
V-169.4
NV-155.2
T=Total Crime Severity Index
V=Violent Crime Severity Index
NV=Non-Violent Crime Severity Index
SK
T-144.8 
V-141.5
NV-146
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T-88.6
V-94.4
NV-86.4
BC
T-95.1
V-94.6
NV-95.2
QC
T-73.5
V-76.5
NV-72.4
ON
T-61.1
V-73.4
NV-56.4
MB
T-117.5
V-167.1
NV-98.5
NWT
T-342.7
V-314.6
NV-353.5
NU
T-326.1
V-469.3
NV-271.1
NB
T-65.0
V-63.3
NV-65.7
NF
T-74.0
V-60.4
NV-79.2
NS
T-79.1
V-84.7
NV-76.9
PEI
T-65.8
V-42.0
NV-75.0
Police-Reported Crime Severity Indexes
Police-Reported Impaired Driving Offences
Province Rate Impaired Driving 
Offences
Rate change 
2010 to 2011
SK 683 7,229 +9%
PEI 493 719 -3%
AB 450 17,001 -1%
BC 412 18,835 +15%
NF 362 1,849 -13%
NS 328 3,097 -10%
MB 322 4,031 +7%
NB 296 2,233 -16%
QC 211 16,820 +2%
ON 130 17,326 -1%
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is another measure of police-reported crime. 
Each offence is assigned a weight, derived from sentences handed down by 
criminal courts. The more serious the average sentence, the higher the offence is 
weighted. The weighted offences are then summed and divided by the population. 
An overall CSI has been created as well as a violent CSI and non-violnet CSI.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2011”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 24, 2012.
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YK
20,920
no change
MB
8,991
-8%
SK
12,272
-3%
AB
7,417
-9%
BC
7,892
-7%
NWT
48,032
+3%
QC
4,459
-6%
ON
4,197
-6%
NF
6,441
-4%
NU
38,986
-2%
PEI
6,238
+1%
NB
5,253
-5%
NS
6,501
-7%
Police-Reported Crime Rates per 100,000 population
Canada’s Top Ten Reported Crimes
Offence Number
Theft Under $5,000 (non-motor vehicle) 497,452
Mischief 315,977
Break and Enter 181,217
Administration of Justice Violations 177,159
Assault-level 1 172,770
Disturb the Peace 117,476
Impaired Driving 90,277
Fraud 89,801
Theft of Motor Vehicle 82,411
Uttering Threats 71,945
Homicide
There were 598 homicides reported, 44 more than 
the previous year. Ontario had the most homicides 
at 161, followed by Alberta (109), Quebec (105), 
and British Columbia (87). The Yukon reported no 
homicides while Prince Edward Island only reported 
one homicide followed by the Northwest Territories 
at three and Newfoundland at four. As for provincial 
or territorial homicide rates, Nunavut had the 
highest rate (21.0 per 100,000 population) followed 
by the Northwest Territories (6.9), Manitoba (4.2), 
Alberta (2.9) and Nova Scotia (2.3). As for Census 
Metropolitan Areas (CMA), Winnipeg, MB had the 
highest homicide rate at 5.1. The Canadian 
homicide rate was 1.7.
Canada
5,756
-6%
Top CMA Homicide Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Winnipeg, MB 5.1 Peterborough, ON 2.4
Halifax, NS 4.4 Saskatoon, SK 2.2
Edmonton, AB 4.2 St. John’s, NS 2.1
Thunder Bay, ON 3.3 Vancouver, BC 1.8
Regina, SK 3.2 London, ON 1.8
Saint John, NB 2.9 Gatineau, QC 1.6
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Robbery
In 2011 there were 29,746 robberies reported, 
resulting  in a national rate of 86 robberies per 
100,000 population. Manitoba had the highest 
robbery rate followed by Saskatchewan, British 
Columbia and Ontario. 
• Winnipeg, MB had the highest CMA 
rate of robbery in Canada (266), 
+3% higher than its 2010 rate. Saguenay, 
QC had the lowest rate (19) for the third year 
in a row. Two CMAs reported jumps of +30% in 
robbery rates; Barrie, ON and Greater Sudbury, 
ON. 
• Five CMAs reported declines in robberies of 
-25% or more; Saint John’s, NL (-43%), Guelph, 
ON (-26%), Sherbrooke, ON (-26%), Regina, SK 
(-25%) and Victoria, BC (-25%).  
Break and Enter
In 2011 there were 181,217 break-
ins reported to police. The national 
break-in rate was 526 break-ins per 
100,000 people. The Northwest 
Territories had the highest break-in 
rate (1,710) followed by Nunavut (1,666). 
Police-Reported Robberies
Province/ 
Territory
Rate Robberies Rate change 
2010 to 2011
MB 178 2,231 +1%
SK 103 1,085 -16%
BC 98 4,465 -10%
ON 86 11,511 -2%
QC 85 6,768 +4%
AB 77 2,917 -11%
NS 50 468 -5%
YK 38 13 -24%
NU 36 12 -16%
NWT 32 14 -41%
NF 22 110 -32%
NB 18 136 -5%
PEI 11 16 -28%
CANADA 86 29,746 -3%
Top Ten CMA Robbery Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Winnipeg, MB 258 Montreal, QC 142
Saskatoon, SK 199 Toronto, ON 128
Regina, SK 196 Edmonton, AB 118
Thunder Bay, ON 149 Calgary, AB 109
Vancouver, BC 147 Halifax, NS 95
Police-Reported Break-ins
Province/
Territory
Rate Break-ins Rate change 
2010 to 2011
NWT 1,710 747 -4%
NU 1,666 555 -18%
SK 858 9,079 -9%
MB 744 9,305 -10%
BC 650 29,723 -6%
QC 632 50,395 -7%
NF 614 3,136 -8%
YK 554 192 -22%
NS 504 4,764 -10%
AB 490 18,534 -19%
PEI 472 689 -7%
NB 447 3,379 -8%
ON 379 50,719 -9%
CANADA 526 181,217 -9%
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• Break-ins accounted for about 15% of all 
property crimes.
• 63% of break-ins were to a residence, 28% to a 
business location, and 10% to other locations, 
such as a school, shed or detached garage.
• Residential break-ins dropped -7% while 
business break-ins declined -11%.
• From 2001 to 2011, the break-in rate dropped by 
-42%.
• Among  CMAs, St. John’s, NL reported the highest 
break-in rate (781) while Toronto reported the 
lowest (276). Only London, ON (+12%) reported 
a double digit increase in the break-in rate, while 
17 CMA’s all reported double digit drops 
including  Saint John, NB (-31%), Edmonton, AB 
(-26%), Halifax, NS (-24%), Kelowna, BC 
(-23%), Calgary, AB (-23%), Gatineau, QC 
(-22%), Sherbrooke, QC (-22%), Saskatoon, SK 
(-21%), St. Catherines-Niagara, ON (-20%), 
Victoria, BC (-17%), Winnipeg, MB (-16%) and 
Guelph, ON (-16%). 
Drugs
In 2011 there were 113,164 
drug-related offences coming  to 
the attention of police. These 
offences included possession, 
t raf f icking, product ion or 
distribution. 
• p o s s e s s i o n o f f e n c e s 
accounted for 79,150 of 
these crimes - cannabis 
(61,406); cocaine (7,392); 
and other drugs (10,352). 
Other drugs include 
heroin, crystal meth, and ecstasy.
• Trafficking, production, and 
distribution offences totaled 
32,974 - cannabis (16,548); 
cocaine (10,251); and other 
drugs (7,215).
• British Columbia had the 
highest drug  related offence 
rates of all 10 provinces for cannabis while 
Saskatchewan topped the list for cocaine and 
Prince Edward Island was tops for other drugs.
• The territories continue to have some of the 
highest drug-related crime rates in Canada.
• Overall, drug  offences were up in 2011 (+3%) 
from 2010, mainly due to a +7% rise in cannabis 
offences.
Top Ten CMA Break-in Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
St. John’s, NL 781 Vancouver, BC 689
Thunder Bay, ON 777 Saskatoon, SK 669
Regina, SK 763 Winnipeg, MB 663
Greater Sudbury, ON 756 London, ON 656
Trois-Rivieres, QC 747 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 644
9%
78%
13%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Possession Offences       
by Drug Type
30%
49%
21%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Trafficking, Production  & Distribution 
Offences by Drug Type
Drug-related Crime Rates by Province
per 100,000 population
Province Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
BC 424 98 68
SK 328 117 64
NS 261 36 48
NF 218 47 67
QC 201 26 64
AB 201 77 34
NB 194 33 51
ON 172 37 42
MB 167 70 31
PEI 116 19 85
Territory Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
NWT 1,243 275 78
NU 1,239 9 42
YK 387 127 20
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Motor Vehicle Theft
In 2011 there were 82,411 motor vehicle thefts 
reported to police, down -12% from 2010 and 
down -56% from a decade ago.
• on average there were 226 vehicles stolen per 
day in Canada in 2011.
• the motor vehicle theft rate was 239 per 100,000 
population.
• the most vehicles reported stolen was in Quebec 
(22,397) while Prince Edward Island had the 
fewest vehicles stolen (120).
• Most CMAs reported declines in motor vehicle 
thefts. Several reported double digit decreases 
including  Victoria, BC (-38%), Sherbrooke, QC 
(-38%), Winnipeg, MB (-37%), Gatineau, QC 
(-29%), St. John, NB (-28%), Kingston, ON 
(-25%), Abbotsford-Mission, BC (-22%), 
Peterborough, ON (-22%) and Vancouver, BC 
(-21%).  
• Six CMAs saw an increase in their motor vehicle 
theft rates; Saskatoon, SK (+23%), Guelph, ON 
(+23%), Moncton, NB (+12%), Brantford, ON 
(+10%), Barrie, ON (+4%) and Halifax, NS 
(+2%).
On December 14, 2011 the Insurance Bureau of 
Canada released its annual list of the most frequently 
stolen vehicles in Canada. According  to the report 
there is an increasing  involvement of organized 
crime in auto theft as evidenced by the appearance 
of high-end models on the list. 
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada www.ibc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Do not follow where the path may lead. Go instead 
where there is no path and leave a trail.” - Harold R. 
McAlindon
Police-Reported Motor Vehicle Thefts
Province/
Territory
Rate Motor Vehicle 
Thefts
Rate change 
2009 to 2010
NWT 488 213 -4%
SK 470 4,967 -2%
NU 450 150 -28%
AB 356 13,461 -13%
YK 329 114 -30%
MB 313 3,919 -31%
BC 288 13,186 -18%
QC 281 22,397 -8%
NB 161 1,215 -3%
ON 155 20,768 -9%
NS 138 1,308 +2%
NF 116 593 +6%
PEI 82 120 +3%
CANADA 239 82,411 -12%
Top Ten CMA Vehicle Theft Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Saskatoon, Sk 579 Edmonton,  AB 367
Brantford, ON 523 Montreal, QC 335
Regina, SK 489 Hamilton, ON 334
Kelowna, BC 437 Calgary,  AB 319
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 431 Winnipeg, MB 318
TOP 10 STOLEN AUTOS - Canada 2011
YR MAKE MODEL
1 2009 Toyota Venza 4-door
2 1999 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
3 2000 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
4 2006 Ford F350 Pickup Trick 4WD
5 2002 Cadillac Escalade EXT 4-door AWD
6 2006 Chevrolet TrailBlazer SS 4-door 4WD
7 2007 Ford F350 Pickup Trick 4WD
8 2001 Pontiac Aztek 4-door AWD
9 1998 Acura Integra 2-door
10 1999 Acura Integra 2-door
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LAWFUL PROBATION ORDER 
‘KNOTT’ NULLIFIED BY NEW 
SENTENCE
R. v. Knott, R. v. D.A.P., 2012 SCC 42
Case 1: R. v. Knott
In 2005 the accused pled guilty to 
possessing  a weapon dangerous to the 
public peace (an axe), breaking  and 
entering  a residence, possession of stolen 
identification and obstruction of a police officer.!He 
was sentenced to 24 months in prison followed by 
three years probation.! He was also sentenced to a 
one year concurrent sentence on a second charge of 
breaking  and entering  with another three-year 
probation order.!The following  month, in a separate 
proceeding, he pled guilty to charges of possessing 
stolen property (an automobile), possessing  break-in 
instruments and obstructing  a police officer.!He was 
sentenced to 16 months in prison, to be served 
concurrently with his other sentences, followed by 
three years of probation.!During  his incarceration he 
assaulted a corrections officer and was sentenced to 
six months to be served consecutively to the 
sentence he was serving.!Four months later he was 
sentenced to eight months of incarceration plus a 
year probation for assaulting  an inmate. After serving 
a total sentence of two years, 11 months, and 16 
days he was released and subsequently breached a 
condition of his 2005 probation order; operating  a 
vehicle without the registered owner present.! He 
was sentenced to 60 days for this breach. By the end 
of 2007, the accused had accumulated four separate 
probation orders.
Case 2: R. v. D.A.P.
The accused pled guilty to sexually 
assaulting  the 13-year-old daughter and 9-
year-o ld son o f h i s common- law 
spouse.!He was sentenced to a conditional sentence 
of two years less a day plus three years of probation. 
Several months later he pled guilty to breaking  and 
entering  and unlawful confinement; he had forced 
entry into the residence of his former partner, the 
mother of the sexual abuse complainants. His 
conditional sentence was converted to incarceration 
and he was also sentenced to three years’ in prison 
on one of the new charges and six months on the 
other, to be served concurrently.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
Both accused sought to have their 
probation orders quashed because 
of the long-standing  practice of 
merging  sentences under s. 139 of 
the Corrections and Conditional 
Sentence 1
24 months (2 yrs)
August 18, 2005
+ 3 yrs. probation
Sentence 2
12 months (1 yr)
August 18, 2005
+ 3 yrs. probation
 Sentence 3
16 months
September 8, 2005
+ 3 yrs. probation
 Sentence 4
6 months
August 10, 2007
Sentence 5
8 months
December 3, 2007
+ 1 yr. probation
breach 
probation    
January 
2009 
R. v. Knott Sentencing Grid
Offence(s):
-possess dangerous weapon
-break & enter
-possess stolen identification
-obstructing a police officer
Offence(s):
-break & enter
Offence(s):
-possess stolen automobile
-possess break-in instruments
-obstructing a police officer
Offence(s):
-assault (corrections officer)
Offence(s):
-assault (inmate)
*served total sentence of 2 yrs, 11 mos, 16 days*
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Release Act (CCRA) for the purpose of determining 
whether a probation order could be imposed. In 
some cases, an otherwise lawfully imposed 
probation order was rendered invalid if an offender 
received sentences that were cumulatively in excess 
of two years, regardless of when the sentences were 
imposed. This was so because s. 731(1) of the 
Criminal Code only allows for the imposition of a 
probation order following  a term of imprisonment 
not exceeding  two years. Section 139 of the CCRA 
deems a person to have been sentenced to one 
sentence commencing  at the beginning  of the first of 
those sentences and ending  on the expiration of the 
last sentence to be served. Thus, by applying  s. 139 
probation orders where nullified when an offender 
received a cumulative sentence in excess of two 
years.!The Crown, on the other hand, challenged the 
law relating  to the retroactive invalidation of lawfully 
imposed probation orders as a result of these 
sentencing merger provisions. !
A division of five judges of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal was empaneled to hear the case and 
unanimously reached three conclusions: 
1. When a judge imposes a sentence at one sitting 
which, either individually or cumulatively, 
exceeds two years (eg.! consecutive sentences 
imposed at the same time by the same judge) 
probation cannot be added to the sentence.
2. If an offender is already serving  a sentence and 
a subsequent sentence is imposed which, when 
combined with the unexpired portion of the 
prior sentence will bring  the total of the 
sentences beyond two years, a probation order 
should not follow, except in the rarest of cases. 
However, a probation order may be imposed 
with a consecutive term of imprisonment if the 
remanent of the prior sentence combined with 
the new sentence does not exceed two years.
3. If an offender was sentenced to a term of 
custody with a probation order and is 
subsequently sentenced so that the aggragate 
sentence exceeds two years, the preexisting 
probation order is not invalidated. The only 
exception is if the offender is subsequently 
sentenced to life imprisonment because then he 
or she will be under supervision for life.!
Supreme Court of Canada
The accuseds again argued, 
this time before the Supreme 
Court of Canada, that their 
probation orders ought to be 
quashed. Since s. 731(1)(b) 
of the Criminal Code permits an order of probation 
on an offender sentenced to “imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding  two years” the accuseds 
submitted that the “term” of imprisonment relates to 
the aggregate of the custodial sentence imposed by 
the judge and all other sentences currently being 
served or later imposed for other offences on the 
offender. The Crown, on the other hand, contended 
that the “term” of imprisonment refers to the actual 
term of imprisonment imposed by a judge at a single 
sitting. 
The seven member unanimous Supreme Court 
agreed with the Crown. First, the merger provisions 
of s. 139 of the CCRA do not apply to an offender’s 
eligibility for a lawful sentence. Section 139 is for 
administrative purposes relating  to parole and 
remission. It does not merge sentences imposed 
Sentence 1
24 months (2 yrs) less a day CSO 
June 3, 2008
+ 3 yrs probation
Sentence 2
36 months (3 yrs) + CSO (sentence 1 above) converted to incarceration
February 19, 2009
R. v. D.A.P. Sentencing Grid
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against the same offender on different occasions for 
the purposes of determining  whether a probation 
order may be struck down for a combined sentence 
exceeding  two years. Second, s. 731(1)(b) is 
unambiguous. “The ordinary meaning  of s. 731(1)(b) 
is perfectly clear,” said Justice Fish. “A probation 
order may not be made where the sentencing court 
imposes a term of imprisonment exceeding  two 
years. In determining  whether two years has been 
exceeded, one looks at! the term of imprisonment 
ordered by the sentencing  court on that occasion — 
not at other sentences imposed by other courts on 
other occasions for other matters.” Thus, the 
availability of a probation order depends on the term 
of imprisonment imposed at the time the probation 
order is made. 
Furthermore, s. 731(1)(b) merely allows a judge to 
impose a probation order and does not say when a 
probation order comes into force nor does it 
anywhere else in the Criminal Code state that a 
probation order must come into effect within two 
years of it being  made. Instead, s. 732.2 addresses 
when a probation order is effective:
In situations where an offender is sentenced to 
incarceration not exceeding  two years but does 
result in continuous custody for more than two years 
when combined with other sentences imposed on 
the same offender by the same judge at the same 
sitting, a probation order cannot be imposed. This is 
so because the total sentence at one sitting  exceeds 
the two year rule under s. 731(1)(b).  
However, s. 731(1)(b) does not prohibit the 
imposition of a fresh probation order when an 
offender is given a sentence not exceeding  two years 
but when combined with a previous or remanent 
sentence does exceed two years. But the fresh 
probation order must still be a fit sentence in the 
circumstances.! “In considering  whether a fresh 
probation order is appropriate, the sentencing  court 
must thus take into account the particular 
circumstances of the offence, the character and 
needs of the offender, and the purpose and relevant 
principles of sentencing,” said Justice Fish. 
“Unexpired prior sentences remain an important 
consideration, though!  not necessarily decisive,! in 
determining  whether! a probation order is 
appropriate.” 
In this case, the accuseds’ probation orders were 
valid when they were made and “no prior or 
subsequent sentences imposed on either [accused] 
had, or could have had, the effect of invalidating  any 
of their probation orders, either prospectively or 
retrospectively.” The appeals were dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional facts in this case summary 
were obtained from R. v. Knott, 2010 BCCA 386. 
MORE ON PROBATION
• Under s. 731(1)(b) of the Criminal Code a court that 
sentences an offender to a term not exceeding two 
years may direct the offender to comply with the 
conditions of a probation order. Thus, a probation 
order may not be made where the sentencing court 
imposes a term of imprisonment exceeding two years. 
• Probation orders are intended to facilitate an 
offender’s rehabilitation and are an effective and 
efficient alternative to unnecessary institutional 
confinement.
• “Sentencing courts may impose separate but 
concurrent probation orders, attached to different 
counts.! This may be done to add supplementary 
conditions appropriate in the circumstances of 
different offences, or to ensure that the offender will 
remain subject to probation if one of the probation 
orders is later set aside or rendered inoperative.” 
• No probation order may continue for more than 
three years from the date on which it came into force 
- s. 732.2(2)(b) Criminal Code.
A probation order comes into force
(a)!on the date on which the order is made;
(b)!where the offender is sentenced to 
imprisonment under paragraph 731(1)(b) or was 
previously sentenced to imprisonment for another 
offence, as soon as the offender is released from 
prison or, if released from prison on conditional 
release, at the expiration of the sentence of 
imprisonment; or
(c)!where the offender is under a conditional 
sentence order, at the expiration of the 
conditional sentence order.
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ONE CASE, THREE SEPARATE 
OPINIONS
R v. Pearson, 2012 ABCA 239
The accused was stopped for 
speeding  after his vehicle was 
clocked on radar travelling  103 km/h 
in a 90 km/h zone. The officer told 
the accused he was being  stopped 
for speeding  and asked for his driver’s licence, 
vehicle insurance, registration and vehicle rental 
agreement. The accused had a British Columbia 
driver’s licence with an address near Vancouver. 
When asked where he was coming  from and going 
to, the accused said he rented the vehicle in 
Edmonton and drove to Vancouver to drop off his 
fiancé and was returning  the rental vehicle to 
Edmonton. The officer noted the vehicle had been 
rented in Edmonton at 9:00 am the previous day and 
the accused had made a very long  journey in a very 
short period of time. The accused was questioned 
about his travel choices and provided odd 
explanations. When returning  the accused’s 
documents, the officer leaned into the vehicle’s 
window and noticed that the accused’s hands were 
trembling. He also smelled the 
intermittent faint odour of raw 
marijuana. As the questioning 
continued the accused became 
more nervous. Although he was 
not convinced that marihuana 
was actually located in the car 
because the odour was faint, the 
officer became suspicious that 
there might be drugs in it. 
The officer asked the accused to get out of the 
vehicle. He told him that he was being  formally 
detained for possession of a controlled substance. 
The officer also said that a police dog  would attend 
to sniff around the vehicle. The accused was verbally 
cautioned  that he did not have to say anything  and 
he had a right to contact counsel. The accused was 
placed in the back seat of the police vehicle and, 
within minutes, a trained narcotics sniffer dog 
attended. The dog  twice positively indicated the 
presence of drugs in the area of the passenger side 
doors. The accused was arrested for possession of a 
controlled substance, read his Charter rights and 
given the police caution again. The vehicle was 
searched and a backpack containing  four bricks of 
cocaine weighing  4.2 kgs. was found in the rear 
hatch area. The accused was then rearrested for 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
Alberta Courts of Queen’s Bench
The Crown conceded breaches of ss. 10(a) 
and (b) of the Charter when the officer 
continued to question the accused after 
smelling  marijuana but argued the 
officer’s initial inquiries were related to the purpose 
of a traffic stop under Alberta’s Traffic Safety Act 
(TSA). The judge found the officer was entitled, 
under the TSA, to ask for information and 
documents, including  the rental agreement, in order 
to ensure everything  was in order. The officer 
properly advised the accused he was being  stopped 
for speeding  as required by s. 10(a) but a s. 10(b) 
right to counsel warning  was not required at this 
time. Furthermore, questions about where the 
accused was coming  from and going  to were 
exploratory in nature and not correlated to any 
specific crime, so no further ss. 10(a) or 10(b) 
warnings were required. The officer then detected 
the odour of marijuana during  the traffic stop, which 
had not been unnecessarily prolonged at this point. 
However, once the odour of marihuana was 
smelled, the purpose of the detention changed and 
the questioning  that followed breached ss. 10(a) and 
(b) of the Charter. 
As for the use of the sniffer dog, only a reasonable 
suspicion was required that the accused was in 
possession of a controlled substance. This was met 
by the fleeting  smell of marijuana, the accused’s 
British Columbia address, the use of a rental vehicle 
and the long  journey in a short period of time. The 
dog’s positive indication of drugs elevated the 
reasonable suspicion to reasonable and probable 
grounds for arrest and the subsequent search of the 
vehicle was lawful as an incident to arrest. The judge 
also held that it was irrelevant that the officer 
suspected there was marijuana when it was cocaine 
that was actually found since the police are not 
required to determine which drug  had been detected 
Timeline
10:24 pm - vehicle 
stop for speeding
10:50 pm - drug 
sniffing dog arrives
10:55 pm - accused 
arrested
11:10 pm - accused 
rearrested for PPT
11:22 pm - scene 
cleared
Volume 12 Issue 4 ! July/August 2012
PAGE 32
by the dog. Thus, no s. 8  Charter breach occurred. 
As remedy for the s. 10(a) and (b) breaches, the 
judge excluded only the statements the accused 
made about the economics of his trip. The accused 
was convicted of possessing  cocaine for the purpose 
of trafficking.  
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
conviction arguing  the judge 
mistakenly concluded, among 
other grounds, that he was not 
arbitrarily detained contrary to 
s. 9 of the Charter  when the 
officer continued to investigate 
him after the original traffic 
investigation was concluded. In 
his view, the original detention 
for speeding  – justified initially 
– quickly exceeded what was 
permitted and went beyond the 
purpose of the original traffic 
stop to became investigatory in 
nature. He further submitted 
that the dog  sniff of his vehicle 
and backpack were unreasonable under s. 8. He 
suggested that his s. 8  right was violated because the 
officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to 
believe that he had committed a criminal offence 
when he requested the assistance of a sniffer dog. 
Further, the grounds used to support the supposed 
reasonable suspicion were obtained in a manner 
that violated his rights. 
The Crown, on the other hand, argued that the 
accused was properly detained pursuant to a lawful 
traffic stop that evolved into a criminal investigation 
and at no time was he arbitrarily detained. Further, 
there were still sufficient grounds to uphold the 
reasonableness of the accused’s continued detention 
even without the excluded conversation. This 
included the smell of marijuana coming  from the 
vehicle, itself sufficient to satisfy the standard of 
reasonable suspicion. The positive indication by the 
dog  of the presence of drugs provided the grounds 
for the accused’s arrest and subsequent search of the 
vehicle was lawful.
Three Alberta Court of Appeal justices heard the 
case and wrote separate but concurring opinions. 
Say One
Justice McDonald found the 
accused’s initial detention for 
speeding  was justified under the 
TSA . Any further detention 
beyond the traffic stop would require reasonable 
grounds to detain. This reasonable suspicion 
standard imports both a subjective and objective 
standard. Although the officer felt the the faint, 
intermittent smell of marijuana in this case was not 
sufficient to justify an arrest under the s. 495(1)(b) of 
the Criminal Code, “it was sufficient to meet the 
lower standard of reasonable suspicion which is all 
that was required on these facts to justify the 
intervention of a drug  sniffer dog.” Plus, “the fact a 
peace officer was concurrently conducting  a traffic 
enquiry while observing  grounds for a drug  related 
offence does not make that detention arbitrary.” 
Thus, there was no s. 9 breach. 
As for a drug  dog  sniff, it is authorized where the 
police have a reasonable suspicion that there are 
illegal drugs present. The trial judge found the 
officer’s decision to call for a drug  detecting  dog  was 
based on more than a hunch and satisfied the 
reasonable suspicion standard. The smell of raw 
marihuana was a significant subjective and objective 
factor which alone created a reasonable suspicion. 
Justice McDonald saw no basis to interfere with the 
trial judge’s ruling. 
Despite the conceded ss. 10(a) and (b) breaches, the 
trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis admitting  the cocaine 
was upheld. 
Say Two
Justice Hunt disagreed with Justice 
McDonald that there was no ss. 8 
or 9 breaches. As for the s. 9 
breach, she said this:
The officer’s evidence makes it apparent that 
although the traffic stop was originally valid, it 
became a detention for the purpose of 
“[T]he fact a 
peace officer 
was 
concurrently 
conducting a 
traffic enquiry 
while observing 
grounds for a 
drug related 
offence does 
not make that 
detention 
arbitrary.”
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investigating a possible drug 
offence. When he began that 
investigation, the officer had 
nothing  more than a hunch or 
suspicion arising  from the date of 
the car rental, the driver’s address 
and the direction in which he was 
travelling. The power to detain 
cannot be exercised on the basis of 
a hunch. Hunches are no substitute 
for the proper Charter standard 
(reasonable grounds) when dealing 
with a subject’s liberty.
The officer testified that he did not have 
reasonable grounds until he smelled marijuana. 
(It should be noted that no marijuana was found 
by the officer or the sniffer dog). It follows that 
the originally valid detention had become 
arbitrary and the [accused’s] section 9 right to be 
free from arbitrary detention was breached. 
[references omitted, paras. 77-78]
When the purpose of the detention shifted to 
criminal activity the officer was required to 
immediately inform the accused of that fact and 
advise him that he had a right to counsel. Justice 
Hunt found that this obligation arose before the 
officer detected the smell of marijuana, which was 
sooner than the trial judge found.
Since the smell of marihuana was detected after the 
ss. 9 and 10 breaches, it could not be used to 
provide the necessary reasonable suspicion upon 
which to base the sniffer dog  search. Justice Hunt 
wrote:
[C]an evidence obtained during  breaches of 
Charter rights (in particular, the odour of 
marijuana) be used to provide the basis of a 
reasonable suspicion so as to justify the use of a 
sniffer dog? If the answer is no, the search by the 
sniffer dog was unreasonable as was the ensuing 
search of the rental car once the dog indicated 
the presence of contraband.
There does not appear to be any jurisprudence 
specifically on this point. It seems counter-
intuitive to permit evidence obtained during 
Charter breaches to provide the foundation for 
further police activity that–without information 
obtained from earlier Charter breaches–would 
clearly have breached other 
Charter rights. Such an approach 
would simply encourage the police 
to breach Charter rights in the 
hopes of finding  something to 
justify their behaviour that, without 
the first Charter breaches, would 
otherwise be illegal. That is hardly 
the promise of the Charter.
Possible support for this view 
comes from the emphasis the 
Supreme Court has put on looking 
at “the entire chain of events during which the 
Charter violation occurred in the course of 
obtaining  evidence.” ... In this case, the search 
that led to the discovery of the contraband was 
connected temporally, contextually and causally 
to the earlier Charter breaches. A chain of events 
perspective suggests it would be inappropriate to 
use the smell of marijuana to provide reasonable 
suspicion for justifying the sniffer dog  search, 
since the earlier breaches permitted detection of 
the odour. In other words, one thing led 
inexorably to another. [refrences omitted, paras. 
80-82]
Justice Hunt found the sniffer dog  and vehicle 
searches were unreasonable. However, like Justice 
McDonald, she also ruled the contraband was 
admissible under s. 24(2). 
Say Three
Justice O’Ferrall too would dismiss 
the appeal, agreeing  with the trial 
judge’s reasoning. Unlike Justice 
Hunt, he found no other Charter 
breaches other than what Crown had earlier 
conceded:
In my view, the critical change in the nature of 
the initial detention, which was not arbitrary, did 
not occur until the investigating officer detected 
the odour of raw marihuana. Although I found 
Justice Hunt’s step-by-step analysis of the 
investigating  officer’s authority to detain and 
question to be logically attractive, I am not sure 
one can so precisely conclude that the Traffic 
Safety Act detention in this case ended and the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act detention 
“The power to detain 
cannot be exercised on 
the basis of a hunch. 
Hunches are no substitute 
for the proper Charter 
standard (reasonable 
grounds) when dealing 
with a subject’s liberty.”
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began when the investigating  officer started to 
suspect there might be some drug trafficking 
going on. The effluxion of a mere eight minutes 
from the time of the stop until the investigating 
officer properly advised the accused that he was 
being detained on suspicion of drug possession 
does not permit precise pinpointing of the 
t r a n s i t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , i f a m e r e 
unsubstantiated and loosely-held suspicion of a 
non-traffic-related offence in the mind of a 
police officer stopping a vehicle for an apparent 
traffic violation triggers a change from a Traffic 
Safety Act detention to a criminal detention, 
then the police would be compelled to advise 
Traffic Safety Act detainees of their Charter rights 
even before they begin administering or 
enforcing that Act. And that cannot be right. 
[para. 112]
Say All
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
RANDOM PROBATION SEARCH 
PROVISION PERMISSIBLE 
R. v. Unruh, 2012 SKCA 72!! !! !! !! !! !! ! 
!
The accused pled guilty to possessing 
child pornography contrary to s. 
163.1(4) of the Criminal Code. A joint 
sentencing  submission was presented 
by Crown and defence counsel 
asking  for a sentence of five years in jail followed by 
three years probation.! The accused planned to live 
with his parents upon his release. Included in the 
joint submission was a probation term whereby the 
accused “shall submit to a search of his person, 
residence, vehicle or computer or computer-related 
device found in his possession, without warrant, by 
any police officer checking to ensure compliance 
with the terms of this order.” The lawyers suggested 
the residual clause in s. 732.1(3)(h) of the Criminal 
Code allowed a sentencing  judge to impose such a 
term as part of a probation order. Section 732.1(3)(h) 
permits the Court to order that a probationer 
“comply with such other reasonable conditions as 
the court considers desirable … for protecting 
society and for facilitating the offender’s successful 
reintegration into the community.” Any such random 
search was to occur between the hours of 8:00 am 
and 8:00 pm. The accused and his parents 
unequivocally and “wholeheartedly” consented to 
the inclusion of the search clause in the probation 
order.
!
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
Despite the voluntary consent of the 
accused and his parents, the sentencing 
judge declined to include the random 
search term because she said she did not 
have jurisdiction to do so. In her view, the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R. v. Shoker, 2006 SCC 44 
directed that the provisions of the Criminal Code 
concerning  the imposition of optional probation 
conditions do not contemplate the imposition of 
random searches.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
!
Th e C r o w n a r g u e d t h a t a 
sentencing  judge could include the 
random search clause in the 
probation order. Justice Herauf, 
writing  the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal’s decision, 
agreed. He found the sentencing  judge too broadly 
interpreted the Shoker decision and a more narrow 
reading  of it was required. “In our view, the Supreme 
Court made it abundantly clear that the decision in 
R. v. Shoker applied only to the ‘compelled seizure 
of bodily samples as an enforcement mechanism’,” 
he said. “The decision does not state that all 
“[I]f a mere unsubstantiated and loosely-held suspicion of a non-traffic-related offence in 
the mind of a police officer stopping a vehicle for an apparent traffic violation triggers a 
change from a Traffic Safety Act detention to a criminal detention, then the police would be 
compelled to advise Traffic Safety Act detainees of their Charter rights even before they 
begin administering or enforcing that Act. And that cannot be right.”
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conditions under s. 732.1(3)(h) of the Criminal Code 
that have a monitoring  or enforcement aspect are 
without jurisdiction.” Plus, the unequivocal consent 
of the probationer and his parents to the residual 
clause in s. 732.1(3)(h) had to be considered as part 
of the circumstances. !
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the random 
search term was included in the probation order 
with the condition that any search must take place 
between the hours of 8:00 am and 8:00 pm.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
OLDER CANADIANS HAVE 
LOWEST RATE OF VIOLENT 
VICTIMIZATION
In March 2012 Statistics Canada released its 
“Victimization of older Canadians, 2009” report. 
Highlights of this recent collection of data included:
• Older Canadians (aged 55+) reported the lowest 
rates of violent victimization, 10 times lower that 
the rate reported by the youngest age group (15 to 
24 years of age).
• Theft of household property (31%) was the most 
common form of non-violent crime reported by 
older households, followed by break and enter 
(29%), vandalism (28%) and theft of motor 
vehicle (13%). 
• Older Canadians (46%) were almost twice as 
likely to report violent incidents to police than 
younger Canadians (28%). 
• Wanting  to stop the incident or receive protection 
was the most commonly cited reason why older 
Canadians reported violent victimization to police 
(75%). This was followed by feeling  a sense of 
duty to notify police (71%) and a desire to see the 
offender arrested and punished (60%). As for not 
reporting  to police, the most commonly cited 
reasons included having  dealt with the incident in 
another way, feeling  the police could not do 
anything  about it, feeling  that the incident wasn’t 
important enough or that it was a personal matter.
 
• Older victims of violence were more likely than 
younger victims to experience emotional 
consequences. Those 55 and older reported anger, 
confusion and fear as the most common 
emotional reactions. 
• The majority of older Canadians (91%) stated that 
there were satisfied with their personal safety.
BY THE BOOK:
s. 732.1(3) Criminal Code
Optional conditions of probation order
The court may prescribe, as additional 
conditions of a probation order, that the 
offender do one or more of the 
following:
(a)!report to a probation officer ...;
(b)! remain within  the jurisdiction of the court unless 
written permission  to go outside that jurisdiction is 
obtained from the court or the probation officer;
(c)!abstain from
(i)! the consumption of alcohol or other intoxicating 
substances, or
(ii)!the consumption of drugs except in accordance with 
a medical prescription;
(d)! abstain from owning, possessing  or carrying a 
weapon;
(e)!provide for the support or care of dependants;
(f)!perform up to 240 hours of community service over a 
period not exceeding eighteen months;
(h)!comply with  such other reasonable conditions as the 
court considers desirable, subject to any regulations 
made under subsection 738(2), for protecting  society 
and for facilitating  the offender’s successful reintegration 
into the community.
... ... ...
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Victimization of older Canadians, 
2009”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released March 8, 2012.
The British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police, the 
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Police Academy are 
hosting the Police Leadership Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada's largest police leadership 
conference. This Police Leadership Conference will provide 
an opportunity for delegates to hear leadership topics 
discussed by world-renowned speakers.
Leadership in policing is not bound by position or rank and 
this conference will provide delegates from the police 
community with an opportunity to engage in a variety of 
leadership areas. The Police Leadership Conference will 
bring together experts who will provide current, lively, and 
interesting topics on leadership. The carefully chosen list of 
keynote speakers will provide a first class opportunity at a 
first class venue to hear some of the world's outstanding 
authorities on leadership, the challenges facing the policing 
community and how to overcome those challenges.
The Service of Policing:               
Meeting Public Expectation
April 7 - 9, 2013
www.policeleadershipconference.com
Rick Mercer chronicles, satirizes and ultimately celebrates all that is great and irreverent about this 
country. Known as "Canada's Unofficial Opposition," Mercer is our most popular comic, a political 
satirist who knows exactly what matters to regular Canadians and what makes them laugh. Born in 
St. John's, Newfoundland, Mercer has won over 25 Gemini Awards.                                          
Assembly of First Nations National Chief Shawn A-in-chut Atleo is a Hereditary Chief from the 
Ahousaht First Nation. In July 2009, Atleo was elected to a three-year mandate as National Chief to 
the Assembly of First Nations. Atleo has been a tireless advocate for First Nations by spending time 
in First Nations in every region of the country.
Craig Kielburger co-founded, with his brother Marc, Free The Children in 1995 at only 12 years of 
age. Today, he remains a passionate full-time volunteer for the organization, now an international 
charity and renowned educational partner that empowers youth to achieve their fullest potential as 
agents of change.
Wendy Mesley is a regular contributor to CBC News: The National, CBC Television’s flagship news 
program, appearing throughout the week in a regular segment that asks provocative questions about 
the news stories Canadians are talking about. She also contributes to CBC News: Marketplace, CBC 
Television's award-winning prime-time investigative consumer show. 
Richard Rosenthal was appointed BC’s first Chief Civilian Director of the Independent Investigations 
Office on January 9, 2012. He has extensive experience in civilian oversight of law enforcement 
having served for 15 years as deputy district attorney for Los Angeles County, where he worked on 
various assignments.
Ian McPherson is a Partner, Advisory Services with KPMG in Toronto and the former Assistant 
Commissioner of Territorial Policing at the Metropolitan Police Service in London, UK. Ian is with 
KPMG's Global Centre of Excellence for Justice and Security, leading its work throughout North 
America.
Major-General (ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie is considered the most experienced peacekeeper on the 
planet. MacKenzie has commanded troops from dozens of countries in some of the world's most 
dangerous places. In Sarajevo, during the Bosnian Civil War, he famously managed to open the 
Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Dr. John Izzo has devoted his life and career to helping leaders create workplaces that bring out the 
best in people, plus discover more purpose and fulfillment in life and work. For over 20 years, he has 
pioneered employee engagement, helping organizations create great corporate cultures and leading 
brands through transformations that create both customer and employee loyalty.
In an increasingly social world, Susan Cain shifts our focus to help us reconsider the role of introverts 
- outlining their many strengths and vital contributions. Like A Whole New Mind and Stumbling on 
Happiness, Cain's book, Quiet: The Power of Introverts In a World That Can't Stop Talking, is a 
paradigm-changing lodestar that shows how dramatically our culture has come to misunderstand and 
undervalue introverts. 
Speakers
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The percentage of Canadians who 
believe that there has been an 
increase in the amount of crime in 
their community over the last five 
years. This compares to 35% of Britons and 45% of 
Americans. 
Only 27% of Canadians fear becoming  a victim of 
crime while 39% of Britons and 35% of Americans 
have the same fear. People in Britain were more 
likely (18%) to report having  been a victim of crime 
in the past two years and calling  the police as 
compared to 13% of Canadians and 12% of 
Americans.
Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion, released April 26, 2012. 
Health care and hospitals 
was the most important 
problem or concern cited 
by 31% of Canadians 
polled. This was followed 
by 26% of Canadians 
citing  the economy, 18% for unemployment, 10% 
for education and schools and only 8% for crime, 
violence, or gangs. 
Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion, released April 26, 2012. 
The percentage of Canadians who 
agree that the prison system in 
Canada does a good job in helping 
prisoners become law abiding. In 
the same poll, 61% agreed the criminal courts did a 
good job in determining  guilt or innocence while 
38% said the justice system treats people fairly. 
Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion, released April 26, 2012. 
The element of the Canadian justice system that 
most people have complete or a lot of confidence in. 
Thirty nine percent of Canadians said they had 
confidence in the internal operations and leadership 
of their municipal police force, compared to 38% 
for the RCMP, 31% for the Supreme Court of Canada 
and only 19% for criminal courts in their province. 
British Columbia residents had the lowest 
confidence level in their provincial courts (10%), the 
RCMP (27%) and their municipal police force 
(28%). Albertans had the lowest confidence in the 
Supreme Court of Canada (16%) but the highest in 
their municipal police (47%) and the RCMP (42%). 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan had the most 
confidence in their provincial courts (27%) while 
Quebec had the highest confidence in the Supreme 
Court of Canada (42%). 
Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion, released April 26, 2012. 
The percentage of Canadians 
supporting  the use of alternative 
penalties - such as fines, probation 
or community service - rather than 
prison for non-violent offenders. Twenty eight 
percent opposed alternative penalties for non-violent 
offenders while 4% were unsure. When looking  at 
different types of offences, 78% of Canadians 
supported non-prison alternatives for personal 
marihuana use, followed by 37% for credit card 
fraud, 31% for drunk driving and 21% for arson.  
Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion, released April 26, 2012. 
The age at which the rate of those accused of a 
Criminal Code offence in 2010 peaked in Canada. 
After age 18, the rate of those accused of crime 
generally decreased with age. 
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Uniform Crime 
Reporting Survey. 
The number of youth accused of 
committing  a crime in Canada in 
2011. Most of them (66,662) 
were accused of committing  a property crime 
followed by 42,799 committing  a violent crime and 
26,186 committing  other crimes. Most of these 
(57%) were diverted from the justice system while 
the remainder (43%) were formally charged.  
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 
2011”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 24, 2012.. 
FACTS - FIGURES - FOOTNOTES
39"
Health 
Care 
19"
Municipal Police
68"
18 years of age
135,647
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The most common location for youth to commit 
crime (32%). This was followed by commercial 
establishments (23%), including  stores, office 
buildings and gas stations, and outdoor public 
spaces (23%), such as streets, parks and parking lots. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010, “Where and when youth commit police-
reported crimes, 2008”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released Summer 2010. 
The peak time for youth crime. During  after school 
hours (3 to 6 pm) 22% of violent youth crime was 
committed along  with 20% of non-violent youth 
crime. In the early afternoon (noon to 3 pm) 24% of 
youth drug  offences were committed while 28% of 
traffic violations were committed at night-time (9 pm 
to midnight).
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010, “Where and when youth commit police-
reported crimes, 2008”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released Summer 2010. 
The province or territory with the highest youth 
crime rate at 36,168  Criminal Code (non-traffic) 
incidents per 100,000 youth population. This was 
followed by:
• Nunavut = 25,235
• Yukon = 18,133 
• Saskatchewan = 16,997
• Manitoba = 9,330
• Nova Scotia = 8,985
• Alberta = 6,918
• New Brunswick = 6,445
• Newfoundland = 6,327
• Prince Edward Island = 5,303
• British Columbia = 4,623
• Ontario = 4,561
• Quebec = 3,800
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010, “Where and when youth commit police-
reported crimes, 2008”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released Summer 2010. 
The number of officers reporting 
they attended an information 
session on professional standards. 
For those members attending  an 
information presentation about professional 
standards, they had much more positive views of the 
Professional Standards Office (PSO). Only 21% of 
those not attending  an information session had 
positive views on the performance of the PSO while 
nearly 41% of those who did attend had positive 
views. Similarly, 53% of survey respondents 
attending  information sessions felt that members of 
the PSO treated officers fairly while only 33% of 
those not attending  did so. For those police members 
attending  the information sessions, they were more 
likely to agree that PSO members:
• try their best to expedite investigations while 
respecting  due process (47% v. 28% of those 
not attending);
• want to help members avoid making  mistakes 
others have made (45% v. 29% of those not 
attending); 
• are open minded (45% v. 25% of those not 
attending); and
• welcome feedback from officers (30% v. 15% of 
those not attending).
Additionally, for those attending  the information 
sessions, they agreed they:
• had more respect for what PSO members do 
(50%);
• learned how to avoid errors in judgment which 
could lead to negative repercussions (47%);
• were more willing  to seek advice from a PSO 
member (42%); and
• were more willing  to report wrongdoing  to a 
PSO member (30%). 
Only 9% of those attending  an information session 
had a more negative view of the PSO, while 61% 
said they did not. 
Source: CACP, CACP Professionalism in Policing Research Project Survey 
Results. 
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The most common type of offence completed in 
adult criminal court. In 2010/2011 there were 
48,033 impaired driving  offences. This was followed 
by theft (42,566), common assault (37,604), fail to 
comply with order (37,247), breach of probation 
(31,157), major assault (20,929), uttering  threats 
(17,652), drug  possession (16,363), mischief 
(14,691) and fraud (14,415). 
Impaired driving  also had the highest conviction rate 
with 84% of adult cases resulting  in a guilty finding. 
Only 13% of impaired driving  cases were stayed or 
withdrawn, 3% of cases resulted in an acquittal and 
1% were classified as other outcomes, such as not 
criminally responsible or unfit to stand trial.  
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Adult criminal court statistics in Canada, 
2010/2011”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on May 28, 2012. 
The number of completed 
cases in adult criminal court 
in 2010/2011 involving 
1,196,917 Criminal Code and other federal statute 
charges.  
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Adult criminal court statistics in Canada, 
2010/2011”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on May 28, 2012. 
The percentage of Vancouver’s 
street-involved youth aged 15-25 
who transitioned to become 
regular injection drug  users after experimenting  with 
drug  injection for the first time. Of these 74%, 60% 
progressed to regular injecting  within one month of 
their first injection while 84% transitioned within 
one year. The same BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/
AIDS study also showed 83% of young  females 
became regular injectors, making  them more 
vulnerable to addiction following  experimentation 
than males at 71%. Neither age nor the type of drug 
(heroin, cocaine or methamphetamine) significantly 
impacted the probability of becoming  a regular 
intravenous drug user.  
Source: Addiction and Urban Health Research Initiative, BC Centre for 
Excellence in HIV/AIDS, 2012, “Most Vancouver street-involved youth who 
experiment with injection drugs become regular drug injectors,” released July 
19, 2012. 
The most trusted profession in Canada. According  to 
two Ipsos Reid polls taken in December 2011 and 
June 2012, 88% of Canadians said they trusted 
firefighters, which topped the list of 40 professions. 
Only 57% of those polled said they trusted the 
police, which was down 12 points from a similar 
poll in 2007. This was one of the largest declines of 
any profession. However, police officers were still 
more trusted than judges (52%), lawyers (25%) and 
lawmakers (national politicians - 10%). 
Source: Ipsos Reid on behalf of Postmedia News and Global Television. 
FACTS - FIGURES - FOOTNOTES
402,980
Impaired Driving
74"
Firefighters
Profession % Trust Profession % Trust
Firefighters 88% Church Leaders 33%
EMTs 86% TV & Radio personality 31%
Nurses 85% Journalists 31%
Pharmacists 78% Environmental Activists 30%
Doctors 75% Travel Agents 28%
Canadian soldiers 74% Pollsters 27%
Airline Pilots 73% Lawyers 25%
Farmers 71% Auto Mechanics 23%
Dentists 67% Taxi Cab Drivers 20%
Teachers 65% New Home Builders 21%
Chefs 58% CEOs 19%
Police Officers 57% Municipal Politicians 17%
Daycare Workers 56% Union Leaders 16%
Judges 52% Actors 14%
Accountants 48% National Politicians 10%
Chiropractors 43% Bloggers 9%
Airport Security Guards 42% Psychics 9%
Plumbers 40% Advertising Executives 8%
Financial Advisors 34% Car Salespeople 6%
Charity Leaders 34% Telemarketers 3%
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The most common 
sentence imposed in 
adult criminal court. In 2010/11 probation was 
imposed, either on its own or in combination with 
other sanctions, in 45% of all guilty cases. The 
median length of a probation order was 365 days. 
Probation was most often imposed in criminal 
harassment cases (90%) and least often for homicide 
(7%) and impaired driving (10%). 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Adult criminal court statistics in Canada, 
2010/2011”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on May 28, 2012. 
Probation was also the most common sentence 
imposed by youth courts in 58% of guilty cases. 
Youth probation was most often imposed in youth 
criminal harassment cases (84%). The median length 
of youth probation was 365 days.  
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Youth court statistics in Canada, 2010/2011”, 
Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on May 28, 2012. 
The province most likely to sentence an impaired 
driver to custody. Ninety-three percent of impaired 
drivers in Prince Edward Island were sentenced to a 
custodial term compared to 8% for Canada. The 
Canadian median length of a custodial sentence for 
impaired driving  was 33 days. Fines were levied 
against 89% of convicted impaired drivers with the 
median fine being $1,000. 
Overall, custodial sentences were more frequently 
imposed in Prince Edward Island (63% of the cases) 
but the median length of these sentences was the 
shortest in Canada (14 days). The median length of 
custody for Canada as a whole was 30 days. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Adult criminal court statistics in Canada, 
2010/2011”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on May 28, 2012. 
The convict ion rate for cases 
completed in youth court. In 2010/11 
there were 29,908 guilty findings out 
of 52,904 cases in youth court. Of the remaining 
cases, 42% were stayed or withdrawn, 1% resulted 
in acquittal and 1% were classified as other 
outcomes like not criminally responsible or unfit to 
stand trial.  
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Adult criminal court statistics in Canada, 
2010/2011”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on May 28, 2012. 
The Criminal Code offence least likely to be cleared 
by police. In 2010, theft of motor vehicle was 
cleared in only 13.5% of police reported incidents - 
7.4% were cleared by charge and 6.1% were 
cleared by other means, such as diversion.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Police-reported clearance rates in Canada, 
2010”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on June 7, 2012. 
There is a lower probability of clearing  a gang 
related homicide than other types. Between 2000 
and 2010, 42% of gang  related homicides were 
solved by police while 88% of non-gang  related 
homicides were solved. Similarly, homicides 
involving  a firearm (56%) were less likely to be 
cleared by police than non-firearm related 
homicides (88%). The overall homicide clearance 
rates have also been declining  over the last 50 years. 
In the mid-1960s about 95% of homicides were 
cleared while today only about 75% are solved. This 
could be due to a sharp increase in gang  related 
homicides between 1993 and 2008, which are 
generally more difficult to solve. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Police-reported clearance rates in Canada, 
2010”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on June 7, 2012. 
The province with 
the highest police 
reported clearance rate at 59.2% of cases. British 
Columbia had the lowest clearance rate at 29.8%.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2012, “Police-reported clearance rates in Canada, 
2010”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on June 7, 2012. 
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Top 5 Cleared Offences
Offence cleared  
by charge
cleared 
otherwise
total 
cleared
Administration of justice violations 85.7 9.9 95.6
Assault police officer 78.5 16.5 94.9
Other violations causing death 82.4 9.9 92.3
Forcible confinement/kidnapping 80.9 6.2 87.1
Other assaults 73.4 9.2 82.6
Gang Related Homicide
Saskatchewan
Foundational Courses:
Intelligence Theories and  Applications
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Intelligence Communications
Specialized Courses:
Competitive Intelligence
Analyzing Financial Crimes
Tactical Criminal Intelligence 
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence
Entrance Requirements:
Proof of completion of bachelor degree;  OR
A minimum of two years of post secondary 
education plus a minimum of five years
of progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information.  Applicants must also write a 
500 – 1000 word essay on a related topic of 
their choice OR
Applicants who have not completed a 
minimum of 2 years post-secondary 
education must have eight to ten years of 
progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information (Dean/Director discretion).  
Applicants are required to write a 500-1000 
word essay on a related topic of their 
choice.
For detailed requirements please visit the 
JIBC Website.
ONLINE GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS | TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Canada | www.jibc.ca |graduatestudies@jibc.ca
Foundational Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Theories and Applications
A survey course that introduces the student 
to the discipline of intelligence and provides 
the student with an understanding of how 
intelligence systems function, how they fit 
within the policymaking systems of free 
societies, and how they are managed and 
controlled. The course will integrate 
intelligence theory with the methodology 
and processes that evolved over time to 
assist the intelligence professional. The 
course will develop in the student a range 
of advanced research and thinking skills 
fundamental to the intelligence analysis 
process.
Intelligence Communications
The skill most appreciated by 
the intelligence consumer is the 
ability to communicate, briefly 
and effectively, the results of 
detailed analytic work. This 
course, through repetitive 
application of a focused set of 
skills to a body of information of 
constantly increasing 
complexity, is designed to 
prepare intelligence analysts to 
deliver a variety of intelligence 
products in both written and oral 
formats.
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Topics include: drug/terrorism/other 
intelligence issues, advanced 
analytic techniques (including 
strategic analysis, predicative 
intelligence etc.), collection 
management, intelligence sources, 
management theory (large 
organizations), attacking criminal 
organizations, crisis management, 
negotiation techniques, strategic 
planning, local/regional updates 
and briefing techniques.
Specialized Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Analysis Tactical Criminal Analysis
Competitive Intelligence 
This course explores the business processes involved in 
providing foreknowledge of the competitive environment; the 
prelude to action and decision. The course focuses on 
supporting decisions with predictive insights derived from 
intelligence gathering practices and methodologies used in the 
private sector. Lectures, discussions, and projects focus on the 
desires and expectations of business decision-makers to gain 
first-mover advantage and act more quickly than the 
competition.
Analyzing Financial Crimes
This course examines the nature and scope of financial crimes 
and many of the tools used by law enforcement in the 
preparation of a financial case. Included in this course is a 
detailed treatment of the following: laws which serve to aid in 
the detection and prosecution of these crimes, the types of 
business records available, types of bank records available, an 
examination of offshore business and banking operations, and 
the collection and analysis of this information, with emphasis 
placed on Net Worth and Expenditure Analysis. In addition, 
special treatment is given to the detection and prosecution of 
money laundering, various types of money laundering 
schemes, and the relationship of money laundering to 
terrorism.
Tactical Criminal Intelligence
This course is an introduction to law enforcement 
terminology, practices, concepts, analysis, and 
intelligence. The course will introduce the student to 
the discipline of crime analysis and law enforcement 
intelligence through the study of the intelligence 
cycle and the intelligence determinants. The role and 
responsibilities of an analyst within each sub-topic 
will be addressed. Additionally, the utilization of 
analytical software will be introduced.
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence 
The course reviews the key requirements for 
intelligence in law enforcement and homeland 
security. The course focuses the use of advanced 
analytic methodologies to analyze structured and 
unstructured law enforcement data produced by all 
source collection. Students will apply these 
concepts, using a variety of tools, to develop 
descriptive, explanatory, and estimative products 
and briefings for decision-makers in the field.
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